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A B S T R A C T
Using combinations of accounting and stock market performance measures, we advance a comprehensive
multidimensional framework for modelling management performance. This framework proposes “poor” man-
agement, “myopia”, “hyperopia” and “efficient” management, as four distinct attributes of performance. We show
that these new attributes align with, and extend, existing frameworks for modelling management short-termism.
We apply this framework to test the management inefficiency hypothesis using UK data over the period 1988 to
2017. We find that takeover likelihood increases with “poor” management and “myopia”, but declines with
“hyperopia” and “efficient” management. Our results suggest that managers who focus on sustaining long-term
shareholders' value, even at the expense of current profitability, are less likely to be disciplined through take-
overs. By contrast, managers who pursue profitability at the expense of long-term shareholder value creation are
more likely to face takeovers. Finally, we document the role of bidders as enforcers of market discipline.
1. Introduction
Management performance is perhaps one of the most explored la-
tent variables in empirical accounting, corporate finance and business
management research. Prior studies (see, for example, Wiersma, 2017;
Bennouri, Chtious, Nagati, & Nekhili, 2018; Paniagua, Rivelles, &
Sapena, 2018) use measures of accounting profitability, including re-
turn on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and return on capital
employed (ROCE), as empirical proxies of management or firm per-
formance, while others (see, for example, Li, Qiu, & Shen, 2018;
Bennouri et al., 2018; Owen & Temesvary, 2018) use market-based
measures such as average abnormal returns (AAR), stock price growth
and Tobin's Q, for the same purpose. The implications of these choices
have not been documented, but, as we will show, in some cases the
choice can lead to inconclusive or even contradictory findings (Danbolt,
Siganos, & Tunyi, 2016; Espahbodi & Espahbodi, 2003). Besides the
lack of consensus about how this latent variable should be oper-
ationalised, current research tradition implicitly views management
performance in a simple unidimensional manner—efficient or poor
management (Rappaport, 2005). Here, firms that report high ROA,
ROCE or AAR are considered efficient, while their counterparts re-
porting low values are considered poor. All other firms are calibrated
along this two-dimensional scale, which provides an indication of re-
lative performance. In this paper, we depart from this tradition by
proposing a comprehensive multidimensional framework for modelling
management performance that consists of four distinct attributes of
performance: (i) poor management; (ii) short-termism, or myopia; (iii)
long-termism, or hyperopia; and (iv) efficient management, instead of
the unidimensional scale (poor—efficient) implicit in prior studies. Our
framework extends the traditional framework but relies on the same
proxies of financial (e.g., ROA, ROCE) and market-based (AAR) mea-
sures of performance that have been recurrently used in the literature.
It recognises that these measures proxy for distinct performance attri-
butes and, hence, are complements, not substitutes.
To demonstrate the applicability of our framework, we draw on a
related issue that has been extensively explored with inconclusive fin-
dings—the role of the market for corporate control (MCC) as a dis-
ciplinary mechanism. The inefficient management hypothesis of take-
overs (Brar, Giamouridis, & Liodakis, 2009; Cremers, Nair, & John,
2009; Danbolt et al., 2016) suggests that takeovers play a key role in the
correction of management inefficiency by targeting underperforming or
poor management. In essence, the hypothesis suggests that takeover
likelihood should decline with management performance, with poor
management most likely, and efficient management least likely, to
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receive takeover bids. Having evidenced the need for a more compre-
hensive multidimensional framework, we extend the literature on the
inefficient management hypothesis by exploring the relation between
our new attributes, myopia and hyperopia, and takeover likelihood. For
this, we draw from the earnings management literature and contribute
to the debate on the consequences of earnings management by (1)
linking earnings management and management inefficiency, and (2)
identifying a market mechanism (MCC) that partly corrects these in-
efficiencies.
Prior research has extensively documented managements' fixation
on achieving short-term earnings targets, even at the cost of long-term
shareholder value creation (Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal, 2006; Healy
& Wahlen, 1999). Healy and Wahlen (1999), for example, find that,
besides applying judgement in financial reporting, managers reduce
long-term investments by freezing hiring, closing underperforming
units and delaying critical maintenance projects, amongst others, in
order to meet short-term earnings targets set by them or their analysts.
In a survey of 401 senior financial executives of US companies, Graham
et al. (2006) also find that 80% of respondents would decrease “dis-
cretionary” spending, such as R&D, advertising and maintenance, to
meet their earnings target. The pervasive nature of such managerial
short-termism is, perhaps, driven by pay-for-performance reward sys-
tems (Duru, Iyengar, & Zampelli, 2012; Lambert & Larcker, 1987). A
few studies have examined whether the takeover market discourages
management short-termism in spite of the incentive to adopt a myopic
approach (Atanassov, 2013; Faleye, 2007; Meulbroek, Mitchell,
Mulherin, Netter, & Poulsen, 1990). For example, Meulbroek et al.
(1990) document a decline in R&D investments in US firms that adopt
antitakeover amendments, while Faleye (2007) finds that US firms with
classified boards are associated with lower R&D spending. Similarly,
Atanassov (2013) finds that US firms incorporated in states that pass
anti-takeover laws experience a decline in innovation in the post-pas-
sage period. While these studies show that a decline in the threat of
takeovers (e.g., by adopting classified boards or operating under the
protection of anti-takeover amendments) reduces the tendency or in-
centive for management to be myopic, they do not provide any insights
on the consequences of management myopia. Our study fills this gap by
exploring whether the MCC potentially disciplines management myo-
pia—which our framework considers to be a form of management in-
efficiency.
Theoretically, the role of the takeover market in enforcing man-
agerial discipline is possibly weakened by the existence of other, per-
haps more efficient, disciplinary mechanisms, including industry com-
petition, corporate monitoring by boards, competition within the
managerial labour market, threat of bankruptcies, and capital flight
from poorly performing to well-performing firms. This suggests that
takeovers are, perhaps, an expensive and imprecise solution to the
problem of management inefficiency (Herzel & Shepro, 1990). Con-
sistent with this view, several prior studies find no empirical support for
the inefficient management hypothesis (Agrawal & Jaffe, 2003; Franks
& Mayer, 1996; Powell, 1997). Notwithstanding, some empirical evi-
dence supports the existence of a thriving MCC, where underperforming
firms get acquired and/or underperforming managers get replaced
through takeovers (Barnes, 1999; Lang, Stulz, & Walkling, 1989; Powell
& Yawson, 2007). We argue that the mixed and inconclusive findings
from prior research are largely a consequence of limitations in the
current conceptualisation of the management inefficiency con-
struct—i.e., how management performance is measured.
Prior empirical studies indiscriminately use accounting and market
measures of performance (e.g., ROA, ROCE, ROE, Tobin's Q and AAR)
to proxy for management performance (Agrawal & Jaffe, 2003; Danbolt
et al., 2016; Powell & Yawson, 2007). These studies consider perfor-
mance as a unidimensional variable along a linear scale with two ex-
tremes—efficient performance and poor performance—and implicitly
assume that each manager's performance can be calibrated along this
unidimensional scale. We decouple the arguably complex construct of
management inefficiency within the context of the MCC by proposing
that “poor” management, “myopia” and “hyperopia” are distinct attri-
butes of inefficient management. In this sense, as opposed to simply
describing management as “good” or “poor”, we propose that managers
can be categorised as “efficient”, “myopic”, “hyperopic” or “poor”. Our
rationale for this new multidimensional framework is summarised
below and fully discussed in Section 2.
It is widely accepted that accounting measures, such as ROA, ROCE
and ROE, amongst others, best measure past performance, whilst stock
market variables, such as abnormal returns, measure future prospects
(Lambert & Larcker, 1987; Rappaport, 1986). Using simple combina-
tions of accounting and stock market measures, we are able to identify
four distinct categories of management performance: (i) efficient (high
accounting and high stock market performance); (ii) myopia (high ac-
counting but low stock performance); (iii) hyperopia (low accounting
but high stock market performance); and (iv) poor (low accounting and
low stock market performance). We validate this framework by
showing that firms classified as myopic are more likely to reduce R&D in
the next period when compared to their hyperopic counterparts. We also
show that myopic firms are associated with positive discretionary ac-
cruals (evidence of accrual earnings management), while their hy-
peropic counterparts are associated with negative discretionary ac-
cruals. We use our multidimensional framework to shed new light on
the inefficient management hypothesis of takeovers.
In summary, we make two main contributions to the extant litera-
ture. First, we develop and validate a simple yet comprehensive mul-
tidimensional framework for modelling management performance. This
method integrates management horizon (short-termism versus long-
termism) with performance and uses readily available firm-level in-
formation to construct proxies. Prior studies primarily use a decline in R
&D expenditure as a measure of management myopia (e.g., Faleye,
2007; Holden & Lundstrum, 2009; Meulbroek et al., 1990; Wahal &
McConnell, 2000), but, as documented by Boubaker, Chourou, Saadi,
and Zhong (2017), a significant proportion of firms do not report any
investment in R&D. Indeed, we find that UK firms report R&D spending
in only 30% of firm-years between 1988 and 2017. Further, firms which
outsource R&D or acquire innovation will be misclassified as myopic
firms due to low investment in in-house R&D projects. A few studies
have used firms' ability to meet analysts' earnings forecasts, a decline in
capital expenditure, and discretionary accruals due to earnings man-
agement as evidence of firm myopic behaviour (Boubaker et al., 2017;
Wahal & McConnell, 2000). The problems with such measures are
evident. For example, earnings forecasts rely on analysts following,
which is biased towards large firms, and capital expenditure will
naturally vary with firm lifecycle and industry. Our measures yield
consistent results with some of these other measures. For example,
firms we classify as myopic in one period report significantly lower le-
vels of R&D investment in the next period, when compared to their
hyperopic counterparts. Additionally, our myopic firms, unlike their
hyperopic counterparts, are more likely to engage in accrual-based
earnings management. Importantly, being less data-intensive than al-
ternative measures, our simple framework can more easily be applied to
a wider set of firms.
Second, we contribute to the merger and acquisition (M&A) litera-
ture by explaining the inconsistent findings in prior studies on the
disciplinary role of takeovers—the management inefficiency hypoth-
esis. This hypothesis has been explored in several prior studies, with
inconclusive findings. For instance, Palepu (1986) and Danbolt et al.
(2016) find that takeover likelihood decreases with a firm's stock
market returns, but increases with a firm's accounting return. Brar et al.
(2009) show that takeover likelihood increases with accounting return.
Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003) find that takeover likelihood has a
negative but insignificant relation with abnormal returns, and a positive
but insignificant relation with ROE. Together, these studies suggest
that, consistent with the hypothesis, takeover likelihood declines with
stock market performance, but, inconsistent with the hypothesis,
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takeover likelihood also increases with accounting performance. We
further discuss these inconsistencies in more detail in Section 2.1. Our
framework, which proposes performance as a multidimensional con-
struct, enables us to shed light on this conundrum. By using our fra-
mework, we show that takeover likelihood increases with poor man-
agement and management myopia, but generally declines with
management hyperopia. We find that efficient managers are least prone
to face takeover bids for their firms. The results suggest that managers
who perform poorly both in the accounting and market sense, as well as
managers who focus on generating short-term profits for investors at
the expense of long-term shareholder value, are more likely to be dis-
ciplined through takeovers. By contrast, managers who focus on
creating long-term value, even at the expense of current profitability,
are less likely to be disciplined through takeovers. This provides new
evidence on the management inefficiency hypothesis and explains the
apparent inconsistencies in prior research. It also provides new insights
on the consequences of earnings management by highlighting the role
of the MCC in discouraging management myopia.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We develop our
multidimensional framework and discuss our hypotheses in Section 2.
We discuss our empirical methods, data and sample in Section 3, and
discuss our empirical results in Section 4. Our concluding remarks are
presented in Section 5.
2. Review of literature and hypotheses development
2.1. Theory and evidence on the disciplinary role of takeovers
The MCC theory suggests that, in an active takeover market, various
management teams compete for the rights to manage a firm's resources
in a manner that maximises shareholder value (Jensen & Ruback, 1983;
Manne, 1965). Consistent with this theory, the inefficient management
hypothesis of takeovers suggests that managers who deviate from the
best interest of their shareholders are replaced by more efficient man-
agement teams (Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Manne, 1965; Palepu, 1986).
Empirical evidence on the inefficient management hypothesis and the
existence of the MCC is generally mixed and inconclusive. Prior studies
either find no support for or evidence against the inefficient manage-
ment hypothesis (Agrawal & Jaffe, 2003; Berger & Ofek, 1996; Franks &
Mayer, 1996).1 Notwithstanding, some contradictory empirical evi-
dence supports the existence of a thriving MCC (Asquith, 1983; Lang
et al., 1989).
More recently, the management inefficiency hypothesis has been
directly tested in the takeover prediction literature. The evidence from
this literature is also inconclusive. In support of the management in-
efficiency hypothesis, some studies find that targets have lower ac-
counting performance (Barnes, 1999; Cremers et al., 2009) and lower
stock market performance (Danbolt et al., 2016; Powell & Yawson,
2007) when compared to non-targets. Others find no significant dif-
ference between targets and non-targets in terms of accounting profit-
ability and stock market performance (e.g., Ambrose & Megginson,
1992; Espahbodi & Espahbodi, 2003). Yet, some studies report mixed
results from the same sample (Brar et al., 2009; Danbolt et al., 2016;
Palepu, 1986).2 In a nutshell, therefore, there is as yet no consensus on
this age-old conundrum: are takeovers initiated to discipline inefficient
management? We examine this question by proposing a recalibration of
the scales for measuring management performance in this context.
2.2. Measuring and calibrating management performance
Management or firm performance is perhaps one of the most studied
concepts in business research, with several studies investigating ante-
cedents or determinants of performance. Yet, there is no consensus on
how performance should be measured (Miller, Washburn, & Glick,
2013). The extant accounting, finance and business literature uses ac-
counting measures, such ROA, ROCE and ROE, as well as market
measures, such as AAR, to proxy for performance. Some studies use
hybrid measures, such as Tobin's Q, price to earnings ratio (PE) and
market to book values (MTB), to proxy for performance, although such
measures have been argued to proxy for market misvaluation rather
than performance (Dybvig & Warachka, 2015). While it is generally
accepted that these pure accounting and market measures reasonably
capture the underlying concept of management performance, their use
sometimes leads to researcher dilemma when empirical results are not
consistent across market and accounting measures (Brar et al., 2009;
Espahbodi & Espahbodi, 2003; Palepu, 1986).
A review of the literature shows that most researchers, at least in
their discussions, calibrate management performance along a two-di-
mensional scale, with “good” and “poor” performance as extremes. This
is particularly prevalent in the M&A literature. Specifically, prior stu-
dies testing the management inefficiency hypothesis (e.g., Agrawal &
Jaffe, 2003; Barnes, 1999; Cremers et al., 2009; Danbolt et al., 2016;
Palepu, 1986; Powell, 2001; Powell & Yawson, 2007), implicitly assume
that management performance can be classified along a scale of efficient
(outperform) or poor (underperform) relative to some benchmark (e.g.,
a sample of matched firms, the industry or the entire market). Further,
these studies indiscriminately use different accounting and stock
market variables, such as ROA, ROE, ROCE, AAR and Tobin's Q,
amongst others, as proxies of management quality or firm performance.
This narrow definition of management performance means that some
studies report conflicting results when two measures of performance
have opposite effects on takeover likelihood. For example, Palepu
(1986) finds that takeover likelihood has a positive but insignificant
relation with return on equity (ROE), but a negative and significant
relation with average excess stock market returns. Espahbodi and
Espahbodi (2003) also find that takeover likelihood has a negative but
insignificant relation with abnormal returns, and a positive but insig-
nificant relation with ROE. Danbolt et al. (2016) find that takeover
likelihood is positively related to ROA (insignificant), but declines with
average excess return.
Whilst it is generally hypothesised that poor management perfor-
mance can lead to takeovers, there is no consensus on what constitutes
“poor management performance”. The mixed findings in the existing
literature appear to be a result of the use of different performance
proxies (both accounting and market-based) across different studies. In
general, firms are described as being poorly managed when their ac-
counting and/or stock market performance is lower than a benchmark,
1 Additionally, these studies find that targets earn negative but insignificant
abnormal returns, zero returns and positive abnormal returns in the period
prior to acquisitions (Jensen & Ruback, 1983). Berger and Ofek (1996) also find
that a firm's return on equity ratio does not affect its probability of being ac-
quired. From an extensive literature review and an empirical study looking at
both target accounting and stock market performance, Agrawal and Jaffe
(2003) conclude that there is little evidence to support the assertion that un-
derperforming firms are more likely to become takeover targets.
2 In Table 1 (p.74), Danbolt et al. (2016) show that UK targets have sig-
nificantly higher mean ROCE (11.8%) compared to non-targets (6.8%). The
difference is significant at the 1% level. Table 2 (p.75) in Danbolt et al. (2016)
(footnote continued)
shows that takeover likelihood is negatively related to average excess return
(AER) (coefficient of −3.552, p-value of 0.000) but positively related to ROCE
(coefficient of 0.087, p-value of 0.171). While the AER results are consistent, the
ROCE results are inconsistent with the management inefficiency hypothesis.
Table 3 (p.436) of Brar et al. (2009) presents descriptive statistics for their
European sample. They find that targets have higher profitability (ROE and
operating margin) when compared to non-targets. Their targets have an oper-
ating margin of 8.1% compared to −12.7% for non-targets (the difference is
significant at the 5% level). Again, the results on the relation between ac-
counting profitability (ROE and operating profit margin) are inconsistent with
the hypothesis.
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and well managed otherwise.
While market-based performance measures (i.e., measures based on
stock prices) are thought to estimate the present value of all future cash
flows that will accrue to a particular stock as a result of the manager's
actions (Lambert & Larcker, 1987), accounting measures have been
criticised for their inability to reflect the future consequences of current
managerial actions (Rappaport, 1986). The two measures of manage-
ment performance can, perhaps, be considered as complements rather
than substitutes, as accounting measures mainly gauge management's
historical performance, whilst market measures assess management's
future prospects. Indeed, Lambert and Larcker (1987) argue that ac-
counting regulations may limit the ability of accounting performance to
reflect future cash flows that a firm may generate as a result of current
management actions; hence, there are benefits in combining accounting
and market measures when evaluating management performance. In
our dataset, we find that, in the case of UK firms between 1988 and
2017, the correlation coefficient (rho) between accounting (ROCE) and
market measures (AAR) of firm performance is −0.05, suggesting that
these two measures are complements, not substitutes, in modelling
management performance.
Much of the evidence in the M&A literature points to the possibility
that bidders show a preference for targets with potential for profit-
ability. There is overwhelming evidence that, on average, targets are
profitable firms—as shown by their accounting performance (Brar
et al., 2009; Danbolt et al., 2016; De & Jindra, 2012; Palepu, 1986). The
evidence also suggests that, despite current profitability, targets have a
lower prospect for future growth or a limited ability to generate future
cash flows (Danbolt et al., 2016). This is corroborated by findings that
targets face declining sales growth and declining stock returns prior to
receiving a bid (Brar et al., 2009; Danbolt et al., 2016; Palepu, 1986;
Powell & Yawson, 2007). In this sense, current empirical tests of the
management inefficiency hypothesis are, perhaps, too general to pro-
vide meaningful insights.
As shown in Fig. 1, management can achieve one of four different
combinations of accounting and stock market performance. Managers
who are able to achieve both high accounting and stock market per-
formance are clearly efficient (efficient). Their counterparts who
achieve low accounting as well as low stock market performance are
also clearly inefficient (poor). We argue that a combination of high
accounting and low stock market performance is indicative of man-
agement short-termism (myopia), as these managers achieve high cur-
rent earnings (accounting performance) from past activities at the
expense of long-term shareholder value (stock market returns). Con-
versely, we argue that a combination of low accounting and high stock
market performance is indicative of management long-termism (hy-
peropia).
Therefore, with regards to our framework, we conceptualise our
categories as follows: (1) Poor management are managers who achieve
relatively low accounting and low stock market returns. That is, they
report low earnings from past activities and also have poor future
prospects or opportunities for generating positive net cash flows. (2)
Myopic management are managers who achieve relatively high ac-
counting but low stock market returns. Such managers report high
earnings from past activities, usually at the expense of future prospects.
(3) Hyperopic management are managers who achieve relatively low
accounting but high stock market returns. While these managers
achieve low earnings from past activities, they have good future pro-
spects. (4) Efficient management are managers who achieve relatively
high accounting and high stock market returns. These managers
achieve high earnings from past activities and also exhibit good future
prospects. The difference between poor and myopic management lies
with their past earnings or accounting performance, i.e., poor man-
agement have low accounting performance, while myopic management
have high accounting performance. Similarly, the difference between
hyperopic and efficient management lies with their accounting perfor-
mance. Poor management and efficient management have no simila-
rities in terms of performance (accounting or stock market). Similarly,
in terms of performance, myopic management are starkly different from
hyperopic management.
Prior studies, such as Palepu (1986), Barnes (1999), Powell (2001),
Agrawal and Jaffe (2003), Powell and Yawson (2007), Cremers et al.
(2009) and Danbolt et al. (2016), implicitly assume the existence of the
first and fourth attributes (i.e., efficient and poor), but ignore the second
and third attributes (i.e., myopia and hyperopia). Clearly, we need to
validate the existence of the second and third attributes, which we do
by exploring the earnings management behaviour of firms in these
categories.
2.3. Management inefficiency and takeover likelihood: Hypotheses
In this section, we develop two testable hypotheses that will allow
us to use our new framework to shed new light on the management
inefficiency hypothesis. Consistent with the objective of the firm
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Manne, 1965), efficient managers are those
who are able to maximise shareholder wealth both in the short and long
run (i.e., the firm's present value). They can create short- and long-term
value by maximising current profitability using strategies that do not
jeopardise future earnings. Additionally, they are less likely to be
swayed by the pressures of meeting earnings targets typically put for-
ward by myopic corporate stakeholders, such as daily traders and short-
term investors. Consequently, firms run by efficient managers are not
only more likely to have higher historical accounting performance, but
also higher stock market performance (efficient), to reflect the firms'
future prospects. Consequently, their strong performance bestows such
managers with the financial backing, reputational clout and stakeholder
(board and shareholders') support required to fend off unwanted take-
overs. By contrast, their counterparts who achieve low accounting
performance and low stock market performance (poor) are unlikely to
have the support required to retain their independence. Consistent with
the undervaluation hypothesis of takeovers (Palepu, 1986), these firms
will constitute an under-priced asset to any bidder with the strategy and
managerial capacity to reverse the firms' fortunes. We therefore hy-
pothesise that managers who perform below (above) average over the
two attributes—accounting and market performance—are more (less)
likely to be exposed to takeovers (hypothesis 1). Our first hypothesis is
formally stated below:
H1. Takeover likelihood declines (increases) with efficient (poor)
Accounting Performance (A)













Fig. 1. Calibrating management performance.
The figure demonstrates the classification of firms into four performance ca-
tegories based on combinations of their accounting and stock market perfor-
mance. Accounting performance is proxied by the return on capital employed
(ROCE), although other measures, including return on assets (ROA), return on
equity (ROE) and net profit margin (NPM), yield a similar result. Stock market
performance is proxied by the average daily abnormal return computed using
the market model. A firm's performance in a particular year is classified as
HIGH if it is greater than the industry median; otherwise, it is classified as LOW.
HA and HM denote HIGH accounting and HIGH market performance, respec-
tively, while LA and LM denote LOW accounting and LOW market performance,
respectively.
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management.
Our second hypothesis focuses on our two new attributes. Prior
research suggests that portfolio managers focus on short-term earnings
and portfolio tracking error rather than traditional discounted cash flow
analysis, whilst financial analysts fixate on current earnings rather than
fundamental analysis in investment decision-making (Rappaport,
2005). It is, therefore, not surprising that managers, in their bid to
satisfy the investment community, prioritise short-term earnings over
the creation of long-term value for their shareholders (Graham et al.,
2006; Rappaport, 2005). This focus on earnings could see managers
decrease discretionary expenditure or investment in projects that yield
long-term value (such as recruitment, training and development, mar-
keting and advertisement, R&D and product development, and the
maintenance of assets and replacement of major equipment) in order to
achieve short-term earnings targets set by them or their analysts
(Graham et al., 2006). For managers to maximise long-term value, their
primary commitment must be to continuing or long-term shareholders
and not to day traders, momentum investors and other short-term or-
iented investors (Rappaport, 2005). Short-termism, or myopia, can,
therefore, be described as a distinct attribute of management in-
efficiency, where managers achieve short-term performance at the ex-
pense of long-term performance.
The flip side to managerial short-termism is a situation where
managers focus on creating long-term value for shareholders at the
expense of short-term profitability—management long-termism or hy-
peropia. Whether this is another attribute of inefficiency is subject to
debate. The view taken in the mainstream finance literature is that the
maximisation of long-term shareholder value is the primary objective of
a firm (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Arguably, a firm with a hyperopic
management team is likely to have a higher stock market value than it
would have with a myopic management team. This high stock market
value reflects future prospects, particularly the future cash flows to be
enjoyed as a consequence of current managerial actions. The inefficient
management hypothesis suggests that inefficiently managed firms are
acquired by bidders who believe they can generate higher future cash
flows given current firm resources (Danbolt et al., 2016; Palepu, 1986).
Consistent with this hypothesis, therefore, it is unlikely that firms with
hyperopic management teams will be targeted by bidders seeking op-
portunities to generate higher future cash flows. Further, such firms are
likely to command a high price in comparison to current profits, making
it difficult for bidders to justify the usual high takeover premiums
(Danbolt & Maciver, 2012; Franks & Harris, 1989). We therefore predict
that firms with hyperopic management teams are less likely to be ta-
keover targets, while firms with myopic management teams are more
exposed to takeovers.
H2. Takeover likelihood increases (declines) with management myopia
(hyperopia).
3. Empirical methods
3.1. Developing the empirical framework
We start by developing measures for our four attributes of man-
agement performance; poor, myopia, hyperopia and efficient. As we will
discuss, our data is obtained from Thomson DataStream, so we note
DataStream variable codes in parentheses. We use accounting and
market measures of performance to capture two measures of manage-
ment performance—historical (accounting) and future (market).
Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Brar et al., 2009; Danbolt et al.,
2016; Palepu, 1986), the return on capital employed (ROCE) and the
average daily abnormal stock return (AAR) over the last year are used
to measure management performance. ROCE is computed as the ratio of
net operating income before tax and depreciation, or EBITDA,
(WC01250) to total capital employed (WC03998). This ratio measures
management's success in utilising resources efficiently in the generation
of profits through regular business operations in the previous period.
The market measure of management performance is the average daily
abnormal return (AAR)—a measure of a firm's stock market perfor-
mance. Daily abnormal returns (DAR) is computed from daily return
index (RI) data using the OLS market model (Brown & Warner, 1985) in
Eq. (1) below.
= +DAR R R( )it it i i mt (1)
DAR for a firm i at time t is given by the difference between the
firm's actual stock return (Rit) and expected stock return + R( )i i mt at
time t. The simple return for each firm i on day t (denoted Rit) and the
market m on day t (denoted Rmt) are first computed. The daily return of
the FTSE All-Share (Rmt) is used as a proxy for the daily market returns.
Next, i and i are estimated by using data in the previous period, t-1
(i.e., 260 trading days). Each firm's daily stock returns in the previous
period are regressed on its daily market returns, and the coefficients of
the regression model are used as estimates of i and i in the current
period. The DAR over the 260 days are averaged to obtain the average
abnormal return (AAR) for each year.
Next, we derive industry-year medians of ROCE and AAR. Each
firm's ROCE and AAR are classified as “high” if they are greater than or
equal to its two-digit SIC code industry median in that year, and “low”
if otherwise.3 These classifications of “high” and “low” are used to
calibrate four attributes of management performance, with each firm-
year observation attributed to only one of these four categories (see
Fig. 1). That is, efficient refers to managers who are able to achieve
“high” accounting (ROCE) and “high” stock market performance (AAR);
myopia to those who achieve “high” accounting but “low” stock per-
formance; hyperopia to those who achieve “low” accounting but “high”
stock market performance; and poor to those who achieve “low” ac-
counting and “low” stock market performance.4
3.2. Validating the framework
We first seek to establish that our attributes are valid and distinct
from each other. Here, we use multiple analysis of variance (MANOVA)
to compare the vector of mean firm characteristics of firm-years in our
four categories. We also use one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) to
compare firm-years in our four categories across several characteristics.
Our objective is to see whether the firms within each of the four cate-
gories are similar to each other but different from firms in the other
three categories. We consider an extensive set of firm characteristics,
including measures of liquidity, leverage, sales growth, free cash flow,
age, size and tangibility, amongst others.
Firms classified by our framework as poor or efficient are clearly
underperforming and outperforming (respectively) in comparison to
their counterparts. We have suggested myopia and hyperopia as two new
attributes capturing management horizon. The extant UK and US lit-
erature argues that a reduction in R&D investment is symptomatic of
management short-termism through real earnings management (Healy
& Wahlen, 1999; Graham et al., 2006; Osma & Young, 2009;
Athanasakou, Strong, C, & Walker, 2011). Hence, our next validation
3 Our use of two-digit SIC codes is consistent with Botsari and Meeks (2008)
and Cohen and Zarowin (2010). We use median values, as our financial vari-
ables, particularly ROCE, are skewed. In robustness checks, we use mean va-
lues, and our results remain qualitatively similar.
4 In robustness checks, we explore other measures of accounting performance,
including operating profit margin (OPM), return on assets (ROA) and return on
equity (ROE). We also compute market performance (abnormal returns) as the
simple excess firm monthly stock returns over the market returns. Further, we
use the industry median instead of the industry mean as the benchmark in ar-
riving at our four attributes of management performance. In untabulated re-
sults, our key findings remain qualitatively the same. We do not report these
due to space limitations.
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test explores whether the firms classified as myopic (and hyperopic) in
our framework are more likely to reduce (and increase) R&D invest-
ments in the next period, respectively. We estimate the following OLS
model (Eq. (2)) for R&D investment (RDI), controlling for firm char-
acteristics, as well as industry and year fixed effects:
= + + +RDI Performance Controlsit it it it1 1 (2)
R&D investment (RDI) is measured as the ratio of R&D expenditure
(WC01201) to total assets (WC02999). The independent variable of
interest is performance, measured using our four dummy variables: poor,
myopia, hyperopia and efficient. A negative coefficient for myopia and
positive for hyperopia will support our contention that these categories
capture firms that are respectively more and less likely to invest in R&D.
In all models, we lag all our independent variables by one period to
address potential reverse causality issues. Another potential source of
endogeneity in our case is self-selection bias, as only 30% of firm-years
in our sample appear to engage in R&D between 1988 and 2017. In our
model, we use the Heckman Two-Stage method (Heckman, 1979) to
correct for selection bias. In the first stage, we estimate the likelihood of
reporting R&D (i.e., R&D > 0) conditional upon observed firm char-
acteristics using a probit model. This allows us to compute the Inverse
Mills ratio (the non-selection hazard), which we use as an additional
control variable in the second stage.5 The other control variables in the
model (stage 1) include variables that have been shown in prior studies
to impact firm-level R&D investments, including Tobin's Q, firm size,
liquidity, leverage, sales growth, level of tangible assets and firm age.
See Appendix 1 for details on variable construction.
While a reduction in R&D is symptomatic of real earnings man-
agement behaviour, it does not provide conclusive evidence of real
earnings management. Second, our use of RDI as the dependent vari-
able in Eq. (2) can lead to simultaneity bias (endogeneity), which might
not be fully addressed by the use of lags. Hence, our second proxy for
real earnings management behaviour through the reduction of discre-
tionary expenditures (primarily R&D) comes from the real earnings
management literature. We do not explore other real earnings man-
agement strategies (specifically, abnormal cash flows from operations
and abnormal production costs) due to the limited evidence on their
pervasiveness in the UK context (Athanasakou et al., 2011;
Athanasakou, Strong, & Walker, 2009). Cohen and Zarowin (2010)
argue that firms that manage earnings upwards are likely to have ab-
normally low levels of discretionary expenses. Hence, we explore
whether firm-year observations classified as myopia (hyperopia) under
our framework report significantly negative (positive) abnormal dis-
cretionary expenses. We follow Dechow, Kothari, and Watts (1998),
Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010) to estimate the
levels of abnormal discretionary expenses for each firm-year observa-
















We first estimate total discretionary expenses (DISX) as the sum of R
&D expenditures (WC01201) and selling, general and administrative
(SG&A) expenditures (WC01101). Consistent with Cohen and Zarowin
(2010), we model total discretionary expenditure as a function of
lagged sales ((WC01001) and estimate Eq. (3) to derive expected or
normal levels of discretionary expenses. All terms in the equation are
scaled by lagged total assets (Assets, WC02999). Abnormal discre-
tionary expenditure (AbDISX) is derived as the residual of this equation.
Given revenue levels, firms that manage earnings upwards (i.e., firms
with myopic management) are likely to report abnormally low discre-
tionary expenses (Cohen & Zarowin, 2010). We use this estimate of
abnormal discretionary expenses to retest Eq. (2) while controlling
reverse causality and self-selection biases.
Finally, we draw on literature which suggests that myopic managers
will manage earnings upwards through accrual management channels
(Jones, 1991; Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995; Peasnell, Pope, &
Young, 2000, 2005; Chen, Rhee, Veerarahavan, & Zolotoy, 2015). In
essence, we explore whether firm-year observations classified as myopia
(hyperopia) under our framework report significantly positive (nega-
tive) discretionary accruals. For completeness, we also explore levels of
discretionary accruals in poor and efficient firms. Peasnell et al. (2000)
suggest that, in the UK context, the Jones (1991) and modified-Jones
(Dechow et al., 1995) models are powerful tools for detecting revenue
and bad debt manipulations. Hence, we use the Jones (1991) model as
modified by Dechow et al. (1995) to estimate discretionary accruals.6
The model suggests that total accruals is a combination of discretionary
accruals (DA) and non-discretionary accruals (NDA), with DA being
used by managers to potentially inflate earnings. Total accruals is de-
fined as the change in current assets (CA, WC02201) minus cash (Cash,
WC02001) minus the change in current liabilities (CL, WC03101) minus
depreciation (DEP, WC01148).7
=Total Accruals CA Cash CL DEPit it it it it (4)










































All terms in Eqs. (5) and (6) are scaled by lagged total assets (Assets,
WC02999). REV, REC and PPE are firm-specific measures of total rev-
enues (WC01001), total receivables (WC02051) and property, plant and
equipment (WC02051), respectively. ∆REVit and ∆RECit measure the
firm-specific one-year change in total revenues and total receivables,
respectively. The difference between reported total accruals and esti-
mated NDA is DA—which is computed as the residual in model (5).
Following evidence (Hunt, Moyer, & Shevlin, 1996) that managers
do not use depreciation accruals to smooth earnings, Botsari and Meeks
(2008) suggest that depreciation and amortisation are not credible
long-term tools for earnings management due to visibility, rigidity and
predictability. Hence, consistent with Botsari and Meeks (2008), we
also compute current accruals by excluding depreciation from the
computation of total accruals in Eq. (4). As in Eq. (7), current accruals is
defined as the change in current assets (CA, WC02201) minus cash
(Cash, WC02001) minus the change in current liabilities (CL,
WC03101). Similarly, as shown in Eq. (8), given that we have excluded
depreciation from our computation of total accruals in Eq. (4), we also
exclude property, plant and equipment (PPE) from our estimation of
total accruals in Eq. (5). Additionally, we estimate the relation between
our estimates of discretionary accruals (DA), i.e., current and total
discretionary accruals, and our attributes of management performance
using Eq. (9).
=Current Accruals CA Cash CLit it it it (7)














= + + +DA Performance Controlsit it it it (9)
The independent variable of interest is performance, measured using
our four dummy variables: poor, myopia, hyperopia and efficient. We
5 Indeed, in our analysis, we find that the Inverse Mills ratio is significant,
hence justifying this analysis.
6 Our results do not materially change and remain robust when we use the
unmodifed version of the model.
7 Following Botsari and Meeks (2008), no adjustment is made for the current
portion of long-term debt due to data unavailability.
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expect to find a positive relation between DA and myopia, but not for
hyperopia, consistent with myopic managers managing earnings up-
wards.
3.3. Modelling takeover likelihood
In our final set of analyses, we use the framework to retest the
management inefficiency hypothesis as set out in hypotheses 1 and 2.
Consistent with prior literature (Brar et al., 2009; Cremers et al., 2009;
Danbolt et al., 2016; Palepu, 1986; Powell, 2001; Tunyi & Ntim, 2016),
we test the relation between a firm's takeover likelihood and our at-
tributes of management performance, controlling for established de-
terminants of takeover likelihood. The base logit regression model is
given as follows (Eq. (10)):
= = + + +Target F Performance ControlsPr[ 1] ( )it it it it1 1
(10)
Target takes a value of one if a firm (i) is the subject of a takeover bid
for control in a period (t), and a value of zero otherwise. The model
classifies each firm as a takeover target or non-target by computing its
odds of being a target in period t conditional upon its observed char-
acteristics in period t-1. The independent variable of interest is perfor-
mance, measured using our four dummy variables: poor, myopia, hy-
peropia and efficient. The controls are variables shown in prior studies to
influence a firm's takeover likelihood. Prior research (Ambrose &
Megginson, 1992; Brar et al., 2009; Cremers et al., 2009; Danbolt et al.,
2016; Palepu, 1986; Powell, 2001) suggests that takeover likelihood is a
function of a firm's size (SIZE), level of free cash flow (FCF), available
tangible assets (TANG), age (AGE), degree of undervaluation (TBQ), the
presence of a mismatch between its level of growth and available re-
sources (SGW, LIQ, LEV, GRD), industry concentration (HHI), the oc-
currence of other takeovers in the firm's industry (IDD), the presence of
block holders (BLOC), the circulation of merger rumours (RUM),
trading volume (TVOL) and market sentiment (SENT). These control
variables, their underlying rationale and selected proxies are sum-
marised in Appendix 1.
Our analysis here is also prone to endogeneity concerns (omitted
variable bias and reverse causality). We partly mitigate omitted vari-
able bias by including several control variables and controlling for firm
and year fixed effects (panel regression). Also, in Eq. (10), we lag our
independent variables by one period to partly control for possible re-
verse causality. To further mitigate reverse causality, we use a two-
stage estimation approach (Newey, 1987), with the industry average of
R&D investment (mRDI) as an instrumental variable for both myopia
and hyperopia. Our instrumental variable meets the relevance condition
(i.e., it is strongly correlated with performance per our attributes)8 and
the exclusion restriction (i.e., industry-level R&D investment has no
bearing on firm-level takeover likelihood). In the first stage we run the
following probit regression models (Eqs. (11) and (12)) to generate
predicted values for myopia and hyperopia.
= = + + +Myopia F mRDI ControlsPr[ 1] ( )it jt it it (11)
= = + + +Hyperopia F mRDI ControlsPr[ 1] ( )it jt it it (12)
In the second stage we use predicted values for our key performance
attributes (i.e., myopia and hyperopia) to rerun Eq. (10).
3.4. Data and sample
Our sample consists of 3522 firms listed on the London Stock
Exchange between 1988 and 2017. To mitigate survivorship bias, all
live and dead firms are included. However, financial firms (i.e., firms
with SIC codes 60–69) are excluded as they follow unique reporting
practices (Botsari & Meeks, 2008). Firm financial information is ob-
tained from Thomson DataStream. Firm-year observations with in-
sufficient financial information (i.e., no total assets reported) are ex-
cluded from further analysis. This generates an unbalanced panel of
39,723 firm-year observations. Notice that only 30% of firm-year ob-
servations report R&D expenditures. This suggests that the use of R&D
in empirical analysis (e.g., as a proxy for myopia) results in a significant
reduction in the usable sample.
Data for 3342 M&A announcements (and their deal characteristics)
for UK listed takeover targets for the sample period is obtained from
Thomson One. We also obtain data on deal characteristics, including
the method of payment (cash versus stock), origin of the bidder (do-
mestic versus cross-border), acquisition motive (control versus stake),
bid outcome (successful versus failed) and bid attitude (hostile versus
friendly). DataStream codes are used to link the two databases, whilst
using the June approach (Soares & Stark, 2009) to maintain appropriate
lags in the model (i.e., takeover probability in the current period is a
function of firm characteristics in the previous period). The June ap-
proach recognises that although most UK firms have a December year
end, their financial data (which bidders are assumed to use in their
acquisition decisions) is only published several (up to six) months later.
In our main analyses, we focus on bids that, if successful, will give the
bidder control (i.e.,> 50% shareholding) of the target.
4. Results and discussions
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for variables used in the
study.9 The mean ROCE and AAR for the sample are 3.3% and 0%,
respectively. The results for ROCE are arguably low perhaps, because
ROCE is negatively skewed. The median ROCE for UK firms between
1988 and 2017 is a more realistic 10.8%. In untabulated results, we find
that the correlation coefficient between ROCE and AAR is −0.05 (p-
value of 0.000). While the p-value is significant at the 1% level, the
magnitude of the coefficient is small, indicating a low possibility of
multicollinearity. The low correlation coefficient between ROCE and
AAR supports our view that the two measures provide different types of
performance-related information and are, hence, complements rather
than substitutes.
In Table 2, we group the firms in our sample under the proposed
four attributes. Over 39.3% of the firm-year observations in the sample
are classified as having efficientmanagement teams, and only 15.1% are
classified as having poor management teams. This suggests that 45.7%
of firms cannot be clearly identified as having either efficient or in-
efficient management teams. Our framework allows us to classify these
under two categories: myopia (26.1% of observations) and hyperopia
(19.7% of observations).
4.2. Results from validation tests
We conduct a number of tests to validate this framework. In our first
test, we explore whether the attributes (i.e., poor, myopic, hyperopic and
efficient) are valid and distinct from each other (i.e., whether firms
under each category are integrally different from firms in other cate-
gories). We use conventional one-way multivariate analysis of variance
(MANOVA) to compare the vector of means of firm characteristics
(Tobin's Q, liquidity, leverage, sales growth, growth-resource mismatch
dummy, industry disturbance dummy, free cash flow, tangible assets,
size, age, industry concentration, block-holders, rumours, momentum
and trading volume) for the four categories of management perfor-
mance. These variables are fully defined in Appendix 1. In untabulated
8We explore this in untabulated results.
9 All continuous and unbounded variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th
percentile.
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results, we find that the key MANOVA test statistics (including Wilks'
lambda, Pillai's trace, Lawley-Hotelling trace and Roy's largest root) are
all statistically significant with p-values of< 0.000. This suggests in-
tegral differences in our four attributes. The results are robust to the
choice of firm characteristics.
In Table 3, we explore this further through a one-way analysis of
variance (ANOVA) with standard Bonferroni correction of the level of
significance (panel A). Given that several of our variables are skewed
(see Table 1), we also use the non-parametric alternative, Dunn's test of
differences in medians (Dunn, 1964), in panel B. This allows us to
compare the means and medians of our 18 firm-level variables across
the four attributes of management performance. In panel A, we find
that the distribution of eight of our variables (including average ab-
normal returns, Tobin's Q, liquidity, free cash flow, size, block holders,
momentum and trading volume) are unique across each attribute and
statistically different from those of the other three attributes. Similarly,
in panel B, when we compare median values, we find that firms in the
four categories are distinct in terms of market to book values, leverage,
tangible assets, size, presence of block holders and momentum.
Our next validation test explores the relation between firm-level R&
D investments and our attributes, in a multivariate setting in which we
control for other firm characteristics. Given that R&D is a discretionary
expenditure, managers can vary its level with a direct impact on re-
ported profit. A cut in R&D will increase current profitability with an
adverse impact on long-term cash flows (Boubaker et al., 2017; Faleye,
2007; Holden & Lundstrum, 2009). A negative (positive) relation be-
tween R&D investments and our myopia (hyperopia) measure will be
consistent with our view that this measure captures management short-
termism (long-termism). We do not have any expectations in terms of
the relation between R&D investments and our poor (and efficient)
measures. Our results from Eq. (2) are presented in Table 4, models 1 to
4. To directly explore real earnings management through a reduction of
R&D and/or SG&A, we also use abnormal discretionary expenses,
computed as the residual in Eq. (3), as an alternative dependent vari-
able in Eq. (2). These results are presented in models 5 to 8. All models
correct for selection bias using the Heckman Two-Stage approach.10 All
independent variables are lagged by one period and all models control
for industry and year effects.
The results from models 2 and 6 suggest a negative and statistically
significant relation between management short-termism and R&D in-
vestment (model 2) or abnormal discretionary expenses (model 6). That
Table 1
Descriptive statistics of variables.
The table reports summary statistics for variables used in the study. The main dependent variables include Target (a dummy variable identifying firms subject to
takeover bids), research & development to total asset ratio (RDI), abnormal discretionary expenses (abDISX), current discretionary accruals (dCACC) and total
discretionary accruals (dTACC). The independent variables include the return on capital employed (ROCE), average abnormal returns (AAR), Tobin's Q (TBQ),
liquidity (LIQ), leverage (LEV), sales growth (SGW), growth-resource mismatch dummy (GRD), industry disturbance dummy (IDD), free cash flow (FCF), proportion
of tangible assets (TANG), firm size (SIZE), firm age (AGE), Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), block holders dummy (BLOC), rumour dummy (RUM), price
momentum (MOM), trading volume (TVOL) and market sentiment (SENT). The variables are fully defined in Appendix 1.
N Mean Median Standard deviation Skewness 25th percentile 75th percentile
Target 38,246 0.048 0.000 0.214 4.217 0.000 0.000
RDI 11,896 0.071 0.020 0.191 20.370 0.004 0.070
abDISX 32,527 −0.002 −0.017 1.698 −4.149 −0.152 0.106
dCACC 30,385 0.000 −0.001 1.816 −61.436 −0.059 0.053
dTACC 30,156 0.002 0.000 1.703 −61.331 −0.054 0.057
ROCE 39,468 0.033 0.108 0.746 −3.614 −0.019 0.220
AAR 34,066 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.028 −0.001 0.001
TBQ 35,963 1.968 1.372 2.209 5.287 1.008 2.038
MTB 35,034 1.709 1.016 2.407 4.228 0.594 1.797
LIQ 39,694 0.161 0.085 0.201 1.996 0.027 0.208
LEV 39,547 0.436 0.216 1.484 3.408 0.011 0.565
SGW 34,937 0.293 0.081 1.261 8.775 −0.031 0.245
GRD 35,790 0.247 0.000 0.432 1.171 0.000 0.000
IDD 39,580 0.294 0.000 0.456 0.905 0.000 1.000
FCF 32,270 −0.066 0.011 0.335 −4.975 −0.084 0.072
TANG 39,228 0.294 0.241 0.254 0.823 0.073 0.445
SIZE 39,712 17.789 17.596 2.311 0.219 16.289 19.155
AGE 36,593 2.774 2.773 1.212 −0.282 1.946 3.829
HHI 38,226 0.122 0.070 0.150 2.812 0.039 0.125
BLOC 39,723 0.355 0.000 0.446 0.634 0.000 1.000
RUM 39,723 0.006 0.000 0.079 12.563 0.000 0.000
MOM 35,816 0.131 0.176 1.187 −0.149 −0.673 0.972
TVOL 36,075 0.211 0.091 0.347 3.314 0.003 0.264
SENT 36,009 0.103 0.145 0.163 −0.854 −0.035 0.220
Table 2
Four attributes of management performance.
The table shows the development of a framework for calibrating performance.
Accounting performance is proxied by the return on capital employed (ROCE),
computed as the ratio of profit before interest and tax (PBIT) to the sum of total
equity and long-term debt. Stock market performance is proxied by average
daily abnormal return (AAR) computed using the market model. Performance
(Accounting and Market) in each year is classified as “low” or “high” if the
firm's ratio (ROCE or AAR) is lower or higher, respectively, than the industry
average in that year. Efficient takes a value of one if a firm reports high ac-
counting and high market performance, and a value of zero otherwise. Myopia
takes a value of one if a firm reports high accounting and low market perfor-
mance, and a value of zero otherwise. Hyperopia takes a value of one if a firm
reports low accounting and high market performance, and a value of zero
otherwise. Poor takes a value of one if a firm reports low accounting and low
market performance, and a value of zero otherwise. We classify all firms in our
sample into these four mutually exclusive categories and record the number of











High High Efficient 15,615 39.3
High Low Myopia 10,365 26.1
Low High Hyperopia 7730 19.5
Low Low Poor 6013 15.1
10 The coefficient of the Inverse Mills Ratio (non-selection hazard) is sig-
nificant in all models, suggesting selection bias in the sample.
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is, firms classified as suffering from myopia in the current period tend to
reduce discretionary expenses, particularly R&D investment, in the next
period. Conversely, our results from models 3 and 6 suggest that firms
classified as hyperopic in the current period tend to grow R&D invest-
ment (model 3) or discretionary expenditures (model 7) in the next
period. This finding is consistent with the extant literature, which
documents a positive relation between short-termism and firm-level R&
D investments (Graham et al., 2006; Wahal & McConnell, 2000). More
importantly, it provides some empirical evidence of the tendency for
our categories to correctly classify firms in terms of management hor-
izon. Notwithstanding, we find similarities between our poor and hy-
peropic, as well as myopic and efficient, attributes. That is, firms classi-
fied as poor (efficient) also report higher (lower) R&D investments and
abnormal discretionary expenses.
Our final validation test focuses on accrual earnings management.
Prior research suggests that short-termist managers seeking to meet
earnings targets can use a variety of accrual earnings management
strategies (e.g., revenue recognition and bad debt manipulation,
amongst others) to inflate reported earnings (Cohen & Zarowin, 2010;
Dechow et al., 1995). We use the modified-Jones model, as specified in
Eqs. (4) to (8), to compute total and current discretionary accruals.
Following Cohen and Zarowin (2010), we expect firms classified as
myopic (hyperopic) to report positive (negative) discretionary accruals.
For completeness, we also report results for our poor and efficient at-
tributes, but have no expectations for these two attributes. In Table 5,
we compare the mean and median discretionary accruals for firms
across the four attributes.
Our results from Table 5 show that observations classified as myopia
report positive discretionary accruals (both total and current), while
those classified as hyperopia report negative discretionary accruals. The
difference in mean and median discretionary accruals for the two ca-
tegories (i.e., (2)–(3)) is significant at the 10% level. This suggest that
firm-year observations we classify under the myopia category are more
likely to be associated with upward accrual earnings management when
compared to their hyperopia counterparts, who appear to manage
earnings downward. When we explore differences in discretionary ac-
cruals reported by the other categories, we find statistically significant
differences between poor and myopia, and between hyperopia and effi-
cient. As in Table 4, we do not find significant differences between our
poor and hyperopia or between our myopia and efficient attributes, in
terms of levels of discretionary accruals.
Our regression results in Table 6 confirm that, after controlling for
firm, industry and year characteristics, levels of current discretionary
accruals decline with poor and hyperopia but increase with myopia and
efficient. These results are robust to different model specifications, in-
cluding the use of the original (unmodified) Jones (1991) model to
compute discretionary accruals, as well as the use of total discretionary
accruals instead of current discretionary accruals. While the results
suggest some similarities between firms in our poor and hyperopia, as
well as myopia and efficient attributes, in terms of R&D investments and
discretionary accruals, our results in the next section will demonstrate
that firms within these attributes face distinct takeover risks.
4.3. Management performance and takeover likelihood
We apply our framework to retest the management inefficiency
hypothesis. Prior studies generally test this hypothesis by investigating
whether targets underperform (relative to non-targets) prior to take-
overs (Agrawal & Jaffe, 2003; Powell & Yawson, 2007) and also by
investigating whether takeover likelihood increases with firm perfor-
mance (Ambrose & Megginson, 1992; Palepu, 1986; Powell & Yawson,
2007; Tunyi & Ntim, 2016). We first replicate traditional tests to de-
monstrate how the lack of a comprehensive framework for calibrating
management performance leads to inconclusive results.
In untabulated results, targets have a mean ROCE of 9.2% compared
to the 2.8% for non-targets. The difference of 6.4 percentage points is
statistically significant at the 1% level (p-value of 0.000).11 These results
Table 3
Firm characteristics across attributes of management performance.
Panel A of the table presents one-way ANOVA results (with Bonferroni cor-
rection of the level of significance) for piecewise comparisons of the means of
the respective variable distributions across the four categories of management
performance (poor, myopic, hyperopic and efficient, denoted respectively by the
letters P, M, H and E, for conciseness). Panel B presents results for differences in
median (Dunn's test) across the four categories. The variables include the return
on capital employed (ROCE), average abnormal returns (AAR), Tobin's Q
(TBQ), liquidity (LIQ), leverage (LEV), sales growth (SGW), growth-resource
mismatch dummy (GRD), industry disturbance dummy (IDD), free cash flow
(FCF), proportion of tangible assets (TANG), firm size (SIZE), firm age (AGE),
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), block holders dummy (BLOC), rumour
dummy (RUM), price momentum (MOM), trading volume (TVOL) and market
sentiment (SENT). The variables are fully defined in Appendix 1. Six (6) com-
parisons (i.e., one-way ANOVA tests) are conducted in each case (M&E, H&E, P
&E, M&H, P&M and P&H). The results of significance testing (at the 10% level)
are summarised in the last column. Here, the cases with a statistically sig-
nificant difference are noted. We use “All pairs” to indicate a statistically sig-
nificant difference across all six cases. We also use “ex” to indicate any exclu-
sions or cases where the difference is not statistically significant.
Panel A: differences in mean
Poor (P) Myopia (M) Hyperopia (H) Efficient (E) Significance tests
(at 10% level)
ROCE −0.258 0.183 −0.277 0.202 All ex P&H, M&E
AAR −0.002 −0.001 0.002 0.001 All pairs
TBQ 2.303 1.926 2.115 1.780 All pairs
MTB 1.938 1.606 1.935 1.578 All ex P&H, M&E
LIQ 0.183 0.127 0.211 0.150 All pairs
LEV 0.428 0.467 0.306 0.483 All ex P&M, M&H
SGW 0.389 0.286 0.281 0.264 P&M, P&H, P&E
GRD 0.244 0.245 0.247 0.251 None
IDD 0.292 0.298 0.296 0.291 None
FCF −0.220 0.012 −0.269 0.023 All pairs
TANG 0.281 0.305 0.274 0.302 All ex P&H, M&E
SIZE 17.199 18.340 16.856 18.114 All pairs
AGE 2.680 2.875 2.647 2.804 All ex P&H
HHI 0.131 0.122 0.131 0.115 All ex P&H
BLOC 0.295 0.418 0.254 0.387 All pairs
RUM 0.004 0.008 0.004 0.007 All ex P&H, M&E
MOM −0.409 −0.271 0.348 0.573 All pairs
TVOL 0.152 0.225 0.176 0.245 All pairs
Panel B: differences in median
Poor (P) Myopia (M) Hyperopia (H) Efficient (E) Significance tests
(at 10% level)
ROCE −0.031 0.159 −0.017 0.166 All ex M&E
AAR −0.001 −0.001 0.001 0.001 All ex P&M
TBQ 1.307 1.496 1.164 1.390 All ex P&E
MTB 0.893 1.125 0.798 1.072 All pairs
LIQ 0.084 0.075 0.099 0.088 All ex P&E
LEV 0.209 0.264 0.135 0.226 All pairs
SGW 0.035 0.092 0.038 0.100 All ex P&H
GRD 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 None
IDD 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 None
FCF −0.087 0.030 −0.092 0.040 All ex P&H
TANG 0.220 0.259 0.207 0.249 All pairs
SIZE 16.987 18.086 16.739 17.890 All pairs
AGE 2.565 2.890 2.565 2.833 All ex P&H
HHI 0.070 0.071 0.070 0.068 M&E
BLOC 0.000 0.110 0.000 0.000 All pairs
RUM 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 All ex P&H, M&E
MOM −0.404 −0.243 0.432 0.634 All pairs
TVOL 0.042 0.115 0.049 0.120 All ex M&E
11 In untabulated results, we find that these results are generally robust to
deal characteristics. Even when one focuses on a subsample of M&As which are
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do not support the management inefficiency hypothesis that targets
underperform (compared to non-targets) prior to takeovers. They are,
nonetheless, consistent with the findings of several studies, including
Agrawal and Jaffe (2003) and Danbolt et al. (2016). The results ob-
tained using market measures of performance are in stark contrast.
Consistent with the predictions of the management inefficiency hy-
pothesis, targets report significantly lower AAR in the year prior to
acquisitions compared to their non-target counterparts. On average,
targets achieve negative AAR of −4.02% per year compared to ab-
normal returns of −1.06% per year earned by non-targets. The differ-
ence in mean of three percentage points is statistically significant at the
5% level (p-value of 0.033). These results are generally robust to deal
characteristics, industry differences and differences across years.
This inconclusive evidence on the management inefficiency hy-
pothesis persists in a multivariate analytical setting in which we regress
takeover likelihood on standard accounting and market measures of
performance.12 The results for panel logit (fixed effects) regressions are
presented in Table 7 (model 1).13 The dependent variable is takeover
likelihood (dummy) and the predictor variables are measures of man-
agement performance; the control variables are defined in Appendix 1.
All independent variables in the models are lagged by one period to
partly control for endogeneity (reverse causality bias). The variables of
interest are ROCE (accounting measure of management performance)
and AAR (market measure of management performance). Consistent
with the results from the univariate analysis, the results show that ta-
keover likelihood declines with AAR and increases with ROCE after
controlling for other determinants of takeover likelihood. These results
are also robust to bid characteristics (untabulated), mirror the findings
of prior studies (Danbolt et al., 2016; Palepu, 1986) and are consistent
with other studies exploring the management inefficiency hypothesis
(e.g., Franks & Mayer, 1996; Agrawal & Jaffe, 2003. These results are
Table 4
R&D and attributes of management performance.
The table presents regression results for Eq. (2), specified below;
RDIit= α+ β ∗ Performanceit−1+ γ ∗ Controlsit−1+ εit (2)
Research & development expenditure to total asset ratio (RDI) is the dependent variable in models (1) to (4). The dependent variable in models (5) to (8) is
abnormal discretionary (R&D and SG&A) expenditures, computed as the residual in Eq. (3) specified below:








The independent variable of interest is firm performance (performance), measured using our four dummy variables: poor, myopia, hyperopia and efficient. For
example, myopia takes a value of one if a firm reports high accounting and low market performance, and a value of zero otherwise. The Controls in the model include
one-period lags of Tobin's Q (TBQ), liquidity (LIQ), leverage (LEV), sales growth (SGW), proportion of tangible assets (TANG), firm size (SIZE) and age (AGE). Models
are estimated using the Heckman Two-Stage approach to control for non-selection hazard (self-selection bias). In the first stage, a probit model is used to compute
each firm's likelihood of reporting R&D > 0 as a function of its characteristics (TBQ, LIQ, LEV, SGW, SIZE, TANG, AGE) in that year. The predicted probability is
used to compute the non-selection hazard (Mills, Inverse Mills Ratio), which is included as an additional control in the second stage model. The p-values are presented
in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
R&D investment Abnormal discretionary expenses









Mills −0.102*** −0.085*** −0.081*** −0.100*** −0.208*** −0.186*** −0.180*** −0.208***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TBQ 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.047*** 0.048*** 0.049*** 0.047***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LIQ 0.106*** 0.121*** 0.120*** 0.109*** −0.052 −0.040 −0.043 −0.051
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.122) (0.234) (0.200) (0.132)
LEV 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.769) (0.613) (0.676) (0.773) (0.321) (0.297) (0.335) (0.325)
SGW 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.145) (0.103) (0.138) (0.152) (0.116) (0.110) (0.137) (0.118)
SIZE −0.018*** −0.018*** −0.017*** −0.019*** −0.051*** −0.049*** −0.047*** −0.051***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TANG 0.062*** 0.051*** 0.049*** 0.060*** 0.028 0.015 0.010 0.026
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.488) (0.714) (0.804) (0.513)
AGE −0.012*** −0.012*** −0.011*** −0.012*** −0.030*** −0.028*** −0.027*** −0.030***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.427*** 0.398*** 0.369*** 0.443*** 1.272*** 1.211*** 1.148*** 1.284***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Industry YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Obs. 30,655 30,655 30,655 30,655 30,500 30,500 30,500 30,500
(footnote continued)
most likely to be disciplinary in nature (i.e., hostile bids and bids for control),
the results do not change—on average, targets achieve higher accounting per-
formance than non-targets.
12 Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients, as well as variance inflation
(footnote continued)
factors (VIF) for the independent variables in the regression model, are first
computed to ensure that there are no issues of multicollinearity. We find that
price momentum (MOM) and average abnormal return (AAR) are correlated
with a rho of 0.4. We therefore do not include MOM in our regressions.
13 Our choice of a fixed effects model specification in Table 7 is validated by
our results from the Hausman specification tests (Chi square and p-values)
shown in the table. All Hausman Chi squares are significant at the 1% level.
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inconclusive, as they neither support nor refute the management in-
efficiency hypothesis.
Next, we replace traditional measures of performance (ROCE and
AAR) in model 1 with proxies for poor (model 2), myopia (model 3),
hyperopia (model 4) and efficient (model 5) management. We find that,
consistent with our first hypothesis, takeover likelihood increases with
poor management (model 2), but declines with efficient management
(model 5). This suggests that managers that achieve high accounting and
high stock market performance (i.e., efficient managers) are less likely to
be targeted by takeovers when compared to managers that achieve low
accounting and low stock market performance. This result is also con-
sistent with the predictions of the management inefficiency hypothesis
(Brar et al., 2009; Danbolt et al., 2016; Palepu, 1986; Tunyi & Ntim,
2016). The results also show that, consistent with our second hypothesis,
takeover likelihood increases with myopia (model 3) but declines with
hyperopia (model 4). In model 8, we include poor, myopia and hyperopia
in the model, with efficient acting as the reference category. The results
show that poor and myopic firms (but not hyperopic firms) have relatively
higher takeover likelihood when compared to efficient firms. Overall, the
results suggest that managers who focus on achieving short-term ac-
counting earnings at the expense of long-term shareholder value (as
measured by their stock market performance) are susceptible to take-
overs, whereas managers who focus on creating long-term value for their
shareholders, even at the expense of generating short-term profitability,
are less likely to be disciplined through takeovers. Our conclusions are
robust to the inclusion of other control variables, such as price mo-
mentum, trading volume and market sentiment.
As opposed to our earlier results (Tables 4–6),14 the results here
(Table 7) show that firms in the weaker performance categories (poor
and myopia), as well as firms in the stronger categories (hyperopia and
efficient), share similarities in terms of takeover likelihood. However,
the coefficients in models 2 and 3 (Table 7) suggest that firms with
myopic management are more likely to face takeovers compared to
firms with poor management. Similarly, models 4 and 5 suggest that
firms with efficient management are less likely to face takeovers com-
pared to firms with hyperopic management teams. These results are
further confirmed when we explore marginal effects (untabulated). The
difference in takeover likelihood between poor and myopic firms may at
first appear puzzling, as we would expect poor firms to be more exposed
to takeovers. One possible explanation for this observation is that, given
that both poor and myopic firms have poor market returns, rational
acquirers are likely to show preference for the category of firms that has
some potential for profitability (i.e., myopic firms).
Even though we have lagged our independent variables by one
period and also used the June approach (Soares & Stark, 2009) to match
our dependent and independent variables, our results are prone to re-
verse causality issues. In essence, one could argue reverse causality –
takeover threat forces managers to perform optimally. To the extent
that optimal performance is consistent with a preference for a long-term
orientation towards investments, as opposed to a myopic view, we
would expect a negative (positive) relation between takeover likelihood
and myopia (hyperopia). Our results are inconsistent with such a view. In
this context, our results in Table 715 rather suggest that a low threat of
takeover incentivises managers to improve performance and vice versa.
This is counterintuitive. Nonetheless, besides using lagged values of
explanatory variables in all our analyses, we also apply a two-stage
Table 5
Discretionary accruals and management performance.
This table reports differences in mean and median discretionary accruals (current and total) reported by firms classified under the four attributes, (1) poor, (2)
myopia, (3) hyperopia, (4) efficient, and (5) the full sample (All firms). The table also reports differences of means and medians between groups. Total discretionary
accruals are estimated as the residual of the Modified-Jones model (Eq. (5)), while current discretionary accruals are estimated as the residual of an adjusted (for PPE)
Modified-Jones model (Eq. (8)):


















REV, REC and PPE are firm-specific measures of total revenues, total receivables and property, plant & equipment, respectively. ∆REVit and ∆RECit measure the
firm-specific 1-year change in total revenues and total receivables, respectively. Total accrual (TA) is computed as the difference between operating income and cash
flows from operations. We do the regression analysis across industry-year subgroups. The p-values are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Current discretionary accruals Total discretionary accruals
Mean Median Mean Median
(1) Poor 0.002 −0.007 −0.007 −0.002
(2) Myopia 0.030 0.000 0.007 0.003
(3) Hyperopia −0.018 −0.006 −0.006 −0.000
(4) Efficient −0.018 0.000 0.004 0.000
Differences Current discretionary accruals Total discretionary accruals
Mean Median Mean Median
(1)–(2) −0.028 −0.007*** −0.014*** −0.005***
(0.300) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(2)–(3) 0.048* 0.006*** 0.013*** 0.003***
(0.068) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(1)–(3) 0.020 −0.013 −0.001 −0.002
(0.227) (0.632) (0.622) (0.165)
(2)–(4) 0.047 0.000 0.002 0.003*
(0.116) (0.699) (0.132) (0.061)
(3)–(4) −0.001 −0.006*** −0.010*** −0.000***
(0.981) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
14 The results show that firms in the poor and hyperopia attributes, as well as
those in the myopia and efficient attributes, bear similarities in terms of R&D
investments and levels of estimated discretionary accruals.
15 That is, a positive relation between takeover likelihood and poor (as well as
myopia) and a negative relation between takeover likelihood and efficient (as
well as hyperopia).
A.A. Tunyi et al. International Review of Financial Analysis 62 (2019) 1–20
11
approach to mitigate reverse causality bias in our analysis. Our focus is
on our new constructs, myopia and hyperopia. In the first stage, we use
mean industry R&D as an instrument to generate predicted values for
myopia and hyperopia. We use these predicted values (i.e., myopia and
hyperopia) in place of the actual values used in models 3 and 4. The
results are presented in models 6 and 7. We find that our results are
robust to reverse causality or simultaneity bias.16
4.4. Switching and takeover likelihood
We expect firms to switch from one category to another over time,
consistent with variability in management performance. Hence, we
explore how frequently firms switch between the four categories,
whether these switches are driven by management efforts to adopt a
more long-term orientation (i.e., investment in R&D, reduction in dis-
cretionary accruals), and how the takeover market responds to such
efforts. To explore the drivers and effects of switching from one year to
another, we assume an ordinal scale for performance, where poor is
ranked lowest (1), followed by myopia (2), then hyperopia (3) and effi-
cient (4). We then identify three categories of firms: improve (firms that
switch from lower to higher ranked categories), maintain (firms that do
not change category) and decline (firms that switch from higher to lower
ranked categories) from one year to the next. We expect to observe
substantial movement (improve) from underperforming categories (poor
and myopia) into the outperforming category (efficient) as management
responds to external pressures, such as those from the takeover market.
In response to such pressures, we expect to also observe comparatively
lower levels of switching (decline) from the outperforming category
(efficient) into the underperforming categories (poor, myopia and hy-
peropia). Results on how frequently firms switch categories are pre-
sented in Table 8.
Indeed, we find significant switching, particularly for our poor
(64.1%), myopic (61.7%) and hyperopic (60.8%) categories. That is,
about 35.9%, 38.3% and 39.2% of observations in our poor, myopic and
hyperopic categories maintain their attributes from one year to the next.
By contrast, only 44.5% of observations in our efficient category switch
to other categories from one year to the next (i.e., 55.5% maintain this
category). These results suggest that, as expected, managers are more
eager to move out of the poor and myopia categories (i.e., improve) when
compared to the efficient category (i.e., decline). We find that a majority
of observations (41.8%) switching from poor move into the hyperopia
category. Similarly, almost half (44%) of firms switching from the
myopia category move into the efficient category.
Next, we specifically explore whether the adoption of a more long-
term approach (e.g., as evidenced by increased investment in R&D or
the accumulation of lower discretionary accruals) partly explains the
switch from underperforming to better performing categories (improve).
We may therefore observe that firms switching up from poor (i.e., im-
prove) are associated with higher R&D investments or lower accumu-
lated discretionary accruals in the previous period. To explore this
issue, we run logit regression models to estimate the likelihood of im-
prove, maintain and decline, as a function of lagged R&D investments and
lagged current discretionary accruals. Our results are reported in
Table 9.
The results (models 1 and 2) from Table 9 show that an increase in R
&D investments, as well as a decrease in discretionary accruals in one
period, increases the likelihood of switching up (improve) in the next
period. Also, as in model 5, a decrease in R&D investments in the
current period increases the likelihood of switching down (decline) in
the next period. Firms that grow their levels of discretionary accruals
(i.e., model 4) appear to stay within their current category. Overall, the
results suggest that firms achieve improved performance (i.e., improve)
partly by taking a long-term view (e.g., by investing in R&D or reducing
discretionary accruals). These results are robust when we use abnormal
discretionary expenses in place of R&D investments in the models. We
explore the implications of a switch (decline, maintain, improve) on a
firm's takeover likelihood in Table 10.
The results from models 1 and 2 suggest that takeover likelihood of
poor firms increases if they do not switch (maintain), and decreases
insignificantly if they switch up (improve). From models 3–5, we find
that takeover likelihood of myopic firms increases slightly if they switch
down to poor (i.e., decline) and significantly if they do not switch (i.e.,
maintain), but their takeover likelihood falls substantially if they switch
up into our hyperopia or efficient categories (i.e., improve). The results
suggests that, compared to poor, the takeover likelihood of myopic firms
is more sensitive to their performance over time. Looking at models
6–10, takeover likelihood of hyperopic firms declines when they main-
tain, with the effects of decline and improve being not statistically sig-
nificant. Models 9 and 10 show that takeover likelihood for efficient
firms increases when they decline and decreases when they maintain.
Overall, our results broadly suggest that firms that switch from un-
derperforming to outperforming categories face lower levels of takeover
risk and vice versa. Additionally, firms in underperforming categories
(specifically, myopia) who do not switch up face higher takeover risks,
Table 6
Discretionary accruals and management performance.
The table reports panel regression results (with firm and year fixed effects)
from Eq. (9), which explores whether attributes of performance (poor, myopia,
hyperopia and efficient) explain variations in levels of discretionary accruals
(DA) across firms.
DAit= α+ β ∗ Performanceit+ γ ∗ Controlsit+ εit (9)
The dependent variable is current discretionary accruals. The control vari-
ables in the model are fully discussed in Appendix 1. The p-values are presented
in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively.









TBQ 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.232) (0.493) (0.866) (0.215)
LIQ −0.082*** −0.082*** −0.081*** −0.082***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LEV −0.002*** −0.002*** −0.002*** −0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SGW 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GRD −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 0.000
(0.971) (0.969) (0.950) (1.000)
IDD −0.003* −0.003* −0.003 −0.003*
(0.079) (0.079) (0.102) (0.085)
FCF −0.042*** −0.040*** −0.043*** −0.043***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TANG −0.067*** −0.066*** −0.067*** −0.067***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SIZE 0.004** 0.003** 0.003* 0.004***
(0.010) (0.048) (0.062) (0.004)
AGE −0.001 −0.000 −0.000 −0.001
(0.758) (0.858) (0.851) (0.736)
HHI −0.016** −0.017** −0.014* −0.017**
(0.040) (0.034) (0.084) (0.037)
BLOC −0.006*** −0.005** −0.007*** −0.006***
(0.007) (0.017) (0.002) (0.004)
Constant −0.030 −0.020 −0.012 −0.045*
(0.235) (0.436) (0.641) (0.083)
Obs. 23,165 23,165 23,165 23,165
R-squared 0.013 0.012 0.014 0.013
Firms 2758 2758 2758 2758
16 Notice that the results for poor and efficient (untabulated) are also robust to
reverse causality or simultaneity bias. We do not present them for conciseness.
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while their counterparts in outperforming categories (hyperopia and
efficient) who do not decline experience lower takeover risks.
4.5. Additional analyses and robustness checks
We conduct two additional analyses in this section. First, we briefly
explore whether acquirers provide market discipline, as suggested by
the management inefficiency hypothesis. Second, we explore an alter-
native explanation for our main finding, i.e., whether valuation rather
than performance explains the differences in takeover likelihood across
the different categories. We also summarise the robustness checks we
have conducted.
Consistent with prior studies testing the inefficient management
hypothesis (Agrawal & Jaffe, 2003; Brar et al., 2009; Danbolt et al.,
2016), our analyses so far have focused on target firms. Here, we extend
these analyses by exploring whether the action by bidders—the tar-
geting of poor management and management myopia—can be con-
sidered as discipline, as suggested by the management inefficiency
hypothesis. If bidders are to act as enforcers of market discipline, then
they themselves should be well-performing prior to making bids. An
alternative view is that bidding firms are also subject to myopia and are
focused on acquiring high profit-making opportunities through
Table 7
Takeover likelihood and management performance.
The table reports results from panel fixed effects logit models (Eq. (10)) estimating a firm's takeover likelihood as a logit function of firm characteristics.
Pr[Targetit=1]= F(α+ β ∗ Performanceit−1+ γ ∗ Controlsit−1+ εit) (10)
The dependent variable in the model (Target) takes a value of one if a firm (i) is the subject of a takeover bid for control in a period (t) and a value of zero otherwise.
In model (1), performance is proxied by a firm's return on capital employed (ROCE) and average abnormal return (AAR). Models (2) to (5) use poor, myopia, hyperopia
and efficient as proxies of performance (see Table 2 for full definitions of these proxies). Models (6) and (7) are two-stage panel fixed effects models controlling for
potential endogeneity using mean two-digit SIC industry R&D investment (RDI) as an instrumental variable for myopia and hyperopia. Myopia and Hyperopia are
predicted values of myopia and hyperopia, respectively. The control variables in the model are fully discussed in Appendix 1. The p-values for model coefficients are
presented in parentheses. Chi2 represents Hausman chi-square. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively.

















TBQ −0.022 −0.003 −0.019 −0.008 −0.012 −0.029 0.008 −0.026
(0.402) (0.904) (0.440) (0.729) (0.634) (0.313) (0.726) (0.309)
LIQ −0.104 −0.097 −0.066 −0.089 −0.081 0.140 −0.104 −0.067
(0.721) (0.738) (0.821) (0.760) (0.781) (0.668) (0.724) (0.816)
LEV 0.039** 0.035* 0.036** 0.036** 0.035* 0.040** 0.036* 0.035*
(0.034) (0.052) (0.050) (0.049) (0.058) (0.037) (0.051) (0.058)
SGW −0.048* −0.046* −0.051** −0.050** −0.045* −0.050 −0.045* −0.049**
(0.057) (0.063) (0.043) (0.047) (0.071) (0.185) (0.069) (0.049)
GRD −0.086 −0.084 −0.101 −0.085 −0.097 −0.060 −0.079 −0.098
(0.187) (0.195) (0.121) (0.188) (0.137) (0.385) (0.231) (0.132)
IDD −0.179*** −0.182*** −0.177*** −0.180*** −0.180*** −0.129* −0.152** −0.176***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.051) (0.017) (0.005)
FCF −0.272 −0.139 −0.214 −0.227 −0.057 −0.011 −0.163 −0.142
(0.158) (0.468) (0.259) (0.232) (0.768) (0.960) (0.387) (0.468)
TANG 0.264 0.245 0.235 0.242 0.248 0.495 0.328 0.253
(0.408) (0.442) (0.462) (0.448) (0.437) (0.164) (0.319) (0.427)
SIZE 0.420*** 0.437*** 0.390*** 0.428*** 0.405*** 0.388*** 0.452*** 0.380***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
AGE 0.392*** 0.385*** 0.403*** 0.386*** 0.402*** 0.497*** 0.399*** 0.409***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
HHI −1.518*** −1.560*** −1.473*** −1.485*** −1.604*** −1.361*** −1.407*** −1.515***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
BLOC 0.754*** 0.765*** 0.730*** 0.735*** 0.782*** 0.652*** 0.737*** 0.745***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
RUM −0.405** −0.404** −0.407** −0.411** −0.392* −0.383* −0.381* −0.395*
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.043) (0.054) (0.063) (0.061) (0.053)
TVOL 0.203** 0.206** 0.202** 0.200* 0.213** 0.189* 0.186* 0.212**
(0.047) (0.045) (0.049) (0.050) (0.038) (0.085) (0.076) (0.039)
SENT 0.277* 0.262* 0.182 0.266* 0.176 0.313* 0.262* 0.159
(0.069) (0.084) (0.232) (0.079) (0.249) (0.051) (0.086) (0.296)
Chi2 862*** 1048*** 848*** 983*** 890*** 891*** 857*** 819***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Obs. 13,663 13,702 13,702 13,702 13,702 11,976 13,153 13,702
Firms 1557 1558 1558 1558 1558 1405 1533 1558
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takeovers. If this is the case, then the acquisition of targets will not
constitute the correction of management inefficiency, but rather parti-
cipation in the “earnings game”. We find that bidders have an average
ROCE of 11.5% in the five years before the bid. This plummets to 0.9%
in the bid year (perhaps due to significant merger costs), before in-
creasing to an average of 13.5% over the five years after the bid. The
AAR generated by bidders before and after the bid are close to zero. In
Table 11 we explore whether the probability of making a bid increases
with bidder management hyperopia and efficiency.
The results from Table 11 suggest that the likelihood of making a
takeover bid increases with management hyperopia (p-value of 0.089)
and declines with poor management (p-value of 0.044). We do not find
evidence that myopic firms are more likely to make bids. Given that
bidder management are, on average, well-performing prior to bids and
less likely to be classified as poor or myopic, their decision to acquire
underperforming firms can, perhaps, be indicative of the role of ac-
quisitions in providing market discipline.
Second, we explore whether valuation rather than performance
explains the differences in takeover likelihood across the different ca-
tegories. Our main result suggests that poor and myopic firms are more
exposed to takeovers compared to their hyperopic and efficient coun-
terparts. If categories of firms with low stock market returns (i.e., poor
and myopic firms) are simply undervalued firms, while their counter-
parts with high market returns (i.e., hyperopic and efficient firms) are
relatively overvalued firms, then our results are consistent with the
misevaluation hypothesis (Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, & Teoh, 2006;
Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, & Viswanathan, 2005; Shleifer & Vishny,
2003). That is, undervalued firms are more exposed to takeovers
compared to their overvalued counterparts (as established by Shleifer &
Vishny, 2003; Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005; Dong et al., 2006, amongst
others).
We argue that this is not the case, and these categories do not simply
proxy for valuation. To evidence this, we group poor and myopic firms
into one category (PM) and hyperopic and efficient firms into another
(HE). We compare the mean and median MTB and TBQ of these two
Table 8
Percentage of firm-year switches between attributes.
The table records the percentage of firm-years switching from one attribute of
management performance (poor, myopia, hyperopia and efficient) to another. In
the table, firms switch from (Switch from:) attributes in the second row to
(Switch to:) attributes in the second column. The diagonal (in bold) shows the
percentage of firm-year observations that do not switch categories from one
year to the next.
Switch from:
Poor Myopia Hyperopia Efficient
Switch to: Poor 35.9 8.6 30.9 4.6
Myopia 9.1 38.3 11.3 35.1
Hyperopia 41.8 9.2 39.2 4.9
Efficient 13.2 44.0 18.6 55.5
Table 9
R&D investments, discretionary accruals and the likelihood of switching.
The table reports logit regressions results on the likelihood of switching (dependent variable: improve, maintain or decline) across attributes (independent variables):
(1) poor, (2) myopia, (3) hyperopia and (4) efficient. Improve indicates a switch from a lower to a higher attribute from one year to the next e.g., a switch from (1) poor
to (2) myopia, and so forth. Decline indicates a switch from a higher to a lower attribute. Maintain indicates no switch. We explore whether the levels of R&D
investment (RDI) and current discretionary accruals (C. Accruals) in the previous year (i.e., lagged values) explain the likelihood of switching. The control variables
in the model are fully discussed in Appendix 1. The p-values are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
Improve Maintain Decline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RDI 0.625*** −0.023 −0.579***
(0.001) (0.893) (0.005)
C. Accruals −0.557*** 0.344*** 0.174
(0.000) (0.006) (0.195)
TBQ −0.206*** −0.196*** 0.029** 0.036*** 0.114*** 0.110***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LIQ 0.083 0.203* −0.051 0.018 −0.013 −0.205*
(0.573) (0.052) (0.710) (0.857) (0.929) (0.053)
LEV −0.014 −0.011 0.026 0.011 −0.024 −0.004
(0.496) (0.352) (0.154) (0.284) (0.263) (0.710)
SGW −0.022 −0.010 −0.025 −0.014 0.051*** 0.028*
(0.301) (0.552) (0.212) (0.368) (0.010) (0.065)
GRD −0.040 −0.064* 0.066 0.017 −0.036 0.048
(0.503) (0.091) (0.233) (0.634) (0.549) (0.204)
IDD −0.038 −0.015 0.079 0.056 −0.052 −0.052
(0.594) (0.701) (0.242) (0.135) (0.464) (0.197)
FCF −0.344*** −0.519*** −0.021 0.262*** 0.307*** 0.198***
(0.002) (0.000) (0.832) (0.000) (0.004) (0.008)
TANG 0.026 −0.092 0.082 0.193** −0.132 −0.127
(0.884) (0.301) (0.619) (0.021) (0.458) (0.159)
SIZE −0.049*** −0.042*** 0.057*** 0.042*** −0.014 −0.002
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.332) (0.829)
AGE 0.014 −0.036** 0.027 0.003 −0.051* 0.028
(0.614) (0.038) (0.286) (0.839) (0.061) (0.112)
HHI −0.189 0.007 0.662** 0.468*** −0.447 −0.462***
(0.571) (0.965) (0.042) (0.005) (0.190) (0.007)
BLOC −0.058 −0.142* −0.059 0.026 0.097 0.097
(0.631) (0.064) (0.595) (0.717) (0.429) (0.223)
Constant 0.181 0.517 −2.408* −2.102*** −0.136 −0.556
(0.857) (0.280) (0.052) (0.000) (0.894) (0.248)
Obs. 8636 21,593 8647 21,593 8638 21,586
Industry YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year YES YES YES YES YES YES
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categories. If our categories simply proxy for valuation, then we would
expect that HE firms should have significantly higher MTB and TBQ
when compared to their PM counterparts. On the contrary, we find that
the mean and median MTB of PM firms are higher than those of HE
firms. As shown in Table 12 (panel A), the mean (median) MTB of PM is
1.727 (1.043), while the mean (median) MTB of HE is 1.694 (0.991).
The difference in mean MTB (0.033) is not statistically significant (p-
value of 0.205), while the difference in median MTB (0.053) is statis-
tically significant (p-value of 0.000). The results are similar when we
use TBQ as a proxy for valuation. The mean (median) TBQ for PM firms
is 2.064 (1.433) as compared to 1.887 (1.318) for HE firms. Here, the
differences in mean and median TBQ are both statistically significant at
the 1% level (p-value of 0.000). The results suggest that poor and myopic
firms have relatively higher valuations than their hyperopic and efficient
counterparts.
We further explore these results in a multivariate setting where we
control for other firm variables. Here, we generate a dummy variable
(PM_HE) which takes a value of one if a firm is in the HE category (i.e.,
hyperopic and efficient firms) and a value of zero if the firm is in the PM
category (i.e., poor and myopic firms). We run panel fixed effects re-
gression models where the dependent variables are MTB (models 1 and
2) and TBQ (models 3 and 4) and the main independent variable is
PM_HE. The model controls for other firm characteristics.
We find that as PM_HE increases by one unit (i.e., a move from PM
to HE), other things remaining equal, MTB reduces by about 27.3%
(model 2) and TBQ reduces by about 33.0% (model 4). The coefficient
of PM_HE is negative and significant at the 1% level in all models.
Consistent with findings from panel A, the results suggest that firms in
the PM category have relatively higher valuations. Hence, it is unlikely
that our categories and results capture valuation. Our findings that PM
Table 10
Impact of switching on takeover likelihood.
The table reports logit regressions results on the impact of switching on takeover likelihood (Target) across the four attributes (1) poor, (2) myopia, (3) hyperopia and
(4) efficient. The dependent variable (Target) takes a value of one if a firm receives a bid, and a value of zero otherwise. Improve indicates a switch from a lower to a
higher attribute from one year to the next e.g., a switch from (1) poor to (2) myopia, and so forth. Decline indicates a switch from a higher to a lower attribute.Maintain
indicates no switch. In models (1) and (2), for example, we explore how the takeover likelihood for firms classified as poor changes if they switch (or not) from one
attribute to the next. The control variables in the models are fully discussed in Appendix 1. The p-values are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Poor firms Myopic firms Hyperopic firms Efficient firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Decline 0.207 0.100 0.425***
(0.133) (0.440) (0.000)
Maintain 0.200* 0.335*** −0.315** −0.411***
(0.097) (0.000) (0.035) (0.000)
Improve −0.192 −0.388*** 0.236
(0.111) (0.000) (0.136)
TBQ 0.018 0.018 −0.101** −0.114** −0.115*** −0.015 −0.017 −0.015 −0.039 −0.038
(0.605) (0.600) (0.020) (0.011) (0.010) (0.621) (0.576) (0.625) (0.171) (0.179)
LIQ 0.461 0.461 0.102 0.187 0.200 −0.496 −0.464 −0.481 −0.353 −0.354
(0.139) (0.139) (0.746) (0.553) (0.525) (0.173) (0.203) (0.188) (0.225) (0.225)
LEV 0.029 0.030 0.040* 0.039* 0.038* 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.053** 0.053**
(0.415) (0.414) (0.069) (0.077) (0.086) (0.837) (0.847) (0.821) (0.022) (0.022)
SGW 0.024 0.024 −0.017 −0.024 −0.022 0.019 0.018 0.019 −0.030 −0.030
(0.447) (0.447) (0.726) (0.630) (0.649) (0.574) (0.600) (0.577) (0.464) (0.465)
GRD 0.015 0.015 −0.031 −0.048 −0.040 −0.097 −0.099 −0.101 0.094 0.095
(0.914) (0.913) (0.743) (0.616) (0.673) (0.535) (0.527) (0.521) (0.267) (0.262)
IDD −0.572*** −0.574*** −0.259*** −0.251*** −0.251*** −0.079 −0.076 −0.070 −0.342*** −0.346***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.587) (0.603) (0.632) (0.000) (0.000)
FCF 0.312 0.311 0.008 −0.084 0.038 −0.067 −0.116 −0.147 0.645* 0.631*
(0.201) (0.203) (0.980) (0.774) (0.898) (0.800) (0.658) (0.574) (0.054) (0.059)
TANG 0.852*** 0.853*** 0.655*** 0.626*** 0.644*** 0.888*** 0.920*** 0.880*** 0.240 0.242
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.114) (0.112)
SIZE 0.158*** 0.158*** 0.049** 0.043** 0.046** 0.133*** 0.133*** 0.137*** 0.092*** 0.092***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.022) (0.044) (0.029) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
AGE −0.098* −0.098* −0.115*** −0.114*** −0.114*** −0.088 −0.088 −0.093 −0.142*** −0.142***
(0.087) (0.087) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.147) (0.145) (0.125) (0.000) (0.000)
HHI −3.531*** −3.537*** −2.535*** −2.442*** −2.427*** −3.658*** −3.660*** −3.579*** −2.196*** −2.208***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
BLOC 0.234 0.235 0.178** 0.146* 0.162* 0.204 0.193 0.201 0.220*** 0.222***
(0.127) (0.127) (0.037) (0.087) (0.057) (0.223) (0.250) (0.229) (0.007) (0.007)
RUM 0.775 0.773 0.638** 0.677** 0.679** 0.426 0.412 0.368 0.208 0.210
(0.154) (0.155) (0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.592) (0.604) (0.643) (0.548) (0.544)
TVOL 0.055 0.055 0.085 0.091 0.095 0.309* 0.318* 0.293 −0.112 −0.112
(0.788) (0.791) (0.459) (0.431) (0.412) (0.091) (0.081) (0.110) (0.305) (0.305)
SENT 0.110 0.109 0.739*** 0.647*** 0.616** −0.036 0.011 −0.002 0.243 0.243
(0.783) (0.784) (0.002) (0.008) (0.011) (0.937) (0.980) (0.997) (0.259) (0.259)
Constant −4.703*** −4.511*** −2.607*** −2.594*** −2.342*** −4.450*** −4.327*** −4.512*** −3.618*** −3.204***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Industry YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Obs. 3611 3611 7781 7781 7781 3675 3675 3675 9456 9456
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firms have relatively higher valuations but lower abnormal returns is
consistent with the value versus growth puzzle (Fama & French, 1998),
i.e., high MTB firms or growth firms (in this case PM firms) earn lower
returns than low MTB firms or value firms (in this case HE firms).
An alternative way of ruling out the valuation argument is to ex-
plore whether our results hold when we use MTB in place of AAR in
deriving our four categories. If our results simply capture valuation, we
expect to obtain similar or stronger results if using MTB rather than
AAR to classify firms into the four categories, then explore whether this
classification affects takeover likelihood. Our findings are presented in
Table 13. Here, we suppress the coefficients of control variables to save
space. We do not find that our results are supported when we use MTB
rather than AAR to categorise firms; while the signs are consistent with
our main results, the coefficients are no longer statistically significant.
This conclusion does not change when we use TBQ in place of MTB.
This further suggests that our results are not driven by misvaluation.
The findings in this study are robust to a number of methodological
choices and endogeneity issues. We have discussed these issues along-
side our results. We provide a brief summary here. First, we recognise
that alternative proxies for accounting and stock market performance
have been used in the literature. In our robustness checks we have
explored alternative measures of accounting performance, including
operating profit margin (OPM), return on assets (ROA) and return on
equity (ROE). In our main analysis, we compute AAR using the market
model. In robustness checks, we have also used the single-index model,
where we assume each firm has an alpha of 0 and a beta of 1. Our
results remain qualitatively similar. Second, in arriving at our cate-
gories, we identify industry groups using the two-digit SIC codes, which
is consistent with the literature (Botsari & Meeks, 2008; Cohen &
Zarowin, 2010). We have explored alternative industry definitions, in-
cluding three- and four-digit SIC codes. When using these alternatives,
we obtain more extreme values and encounter several missing values,
particularly when computing discretionary accruals using cross-sec-
tional regressions (across industry-year subgroups). Nonetheless, our
main results remain qualitatively robust. Finally, given that financial
variables are skewed (see Table 1), we use industry medians as the
benchmark to classify firms into our categories. We have explored in-
dustry means as an alternative, and the results remain robust. These
additional results are available upon request.
5. Summary and conclusion
Performance, in the context of firms and their managers, is perhaps
one of the most studied issues in accounting, corporate finance and
business management research. Nonetheless, there is no comprehensive
framework for assessing performance. Different studies use different
Table 11
Determinants of bid likelihood.
The table shows panel logit regression summary results for models which
predict firm takeover likelihood as a function of firm financial characteristics.
The model is adapted from Eq. (10), specified as follows:
Pr[Bidderit=1]= F(α+ β ∗ Performanceit−1+ γ ∗ Controlsit−1+ εit) (10)
Here, the dependent variable (Bidder) takes a value of one if a firm (i) initiates
a takeover bid for control in a period (t) and a value of zero otherwise. Poor,
myopia, hyperopia and efficient are used as proxies of performance in models (1)
to (4) (see Fig. 1 for full definitions of these proxies). For conciseness, only the
coefficient of the main independent variable (performance) and its p-value are
presented. The control variables (suppressed from each model) are fully dis-
cussed in Appendix 1. These include Tobin's Q (TBQ), liquidity (LIQ), leverage
(LEV), sales growth (SGW), growth-resource mismatch dummy (GRD), industry
disturbance dummy (IDD), free cash flow (FCF), tangible assets (TANG), firm
size (SIZE), firm age (AGE), industry concentration (HHI) and block holders
dummy (BLOC). The p-values for model coefficients are presented in parenth-
esis. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of
significance, respectively.
Poor Myopia Hyperopia Efficient









Industry YES YES YES YES
Year YES YES YES YES
Obs. 8222 8222 8222 8222
Firms 604 604 604 604
Table 12
Firm valuation versus management performance.
This table explores whether the categories of management performance proxy
for valuation, i.e., whether poor and myopic firms (PM) are low valuation (un-
dervalued) firms, while hyperopic and efficient firms (HE) are high valuation
(overvalued) firms. Panel A presents differences of mean and median market to
book (MTB) values and Tobin's Q (TBQ) of two groups: PM (poor and myopic
firms) versus HE (hyperopic and efficient firms). Panel B presents results for
panel fixed effects regressions where the dependent variable is MTB (models 1
and 2) and TBQ (models 3 and 4). The main independent variable is PM_HE, a
dummy variable which takes a value of one if a firm is classified as hyperopic or
efficient, and a value of zero if the firm is classified as poor or myopic. Models 1
and 3 have no additional control variables. Models 2 and 4 control for liquidity
(LIQ), leverage (LEV), sales growth (SGW), free cash flow (FCF), tangible fixed
assets (TANG), firm size (SIZE), firm age (AGE), industry concentration (HHI)
and the presence of block holders (BLOC). The coefficients of control variables
in models 2 and 4 are suppressed to save space. All variables are fully defined in
Appendix 1. The p-values for model coefficients are presented in parentheses.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of
significance, respectively.










Mean MTB 1.727 1.694 −0.033 (0.205)
Median MTB 1.044 0.991 −0.053*** (0.000)
Mean TBQ 2.064 1.888 −0.176*** (0.000)
Median TBQ 1.433 1.318 −0.115*** (0.000)
Panel B: panel regression
MTB TBQ
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PM_HE −0.115*** −0.274*** −0.183*** −0.331***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Controls NO YES NO YES
Constant 1.772*** 10.044*** 2.068*** 11.853***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 35,034 24,356 35,963 25,113
R-squared 0.001 0.082 0.003 0.152
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Firms 3204 2858 3391 2995
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measures, ranging from accounting (e.g., ROA, ROE, ROCE) and stock
market (e.g., abnormal returns such as AAR) to hybrid measures (e.g.,
MTB or Tobin's Q). In this study, we argue that these measures are
complements rather than substitutes, and this is supported by our
finding that, in a UK sample of listed firms from 1988 to 2017, the
correlation coefficient (rho) between ROCE and AAR is −0.05. It is
widely agreed that accounting measures capture historical performance
(e.g., over the last year), while market measures are forward looking.
Assuming that these measures (accounting and market) are comple-
ments rather than substitutes, we use simple combinations to develop a
performance assessment framework, which suggests that myopia and
hyperopia are additional distinct attributes of management performance
besides the classic attributes of efficient and poormanagement. We show
how simple accounting and market variables can be used to oper-
ationalise these four attributes. To validate the framework, we draw on
prior literature suggesting that myopic firms are associated with de-
clines in R&D investments (a strategy for real earnings management), as
well as positive discretionary accruals (accrual earnings management).
We show that firms subject tomyopia (hyperopia), as per our framework,
are substantially more likely to cut (grow) R&D investments in the
following period. We also show that myopic (hyperopic) firms are asso-
ciated with significant positive (negative) discretionary accruals. We
use this new calibration to re-examine a contentious issue—the in-
efficient management hypothesis of takeovers.
Prior studies using either accounting or market-based measures of
performance provide inconsistent results with regard to whether the
inefficient management hypothesis of takeovers holds (with takeover
probability decreasing with market performance but increasing with the
level of accounting earnings). Our framework, combining accounting
and market-based measures of performance to identify management
quality, resolves this conundrum. Consistent with the inefficient man-
agement hypothesis, the results reveal that management teams that
underperform in terms of both accounting profitability and stock
market performance are susceptible to takeovers. However, manage-
ment teams that focus on short-term profits at the expense of long-term
shareholder value (myopia) are even more likely to be disciplined by the
takeover market. Management teams that focus on long-term value
creation, even at the expense of short-term profitability (hyperopia), are
not disciplined by the takeover market. We also find that well-per-
forming management teams are least susceptible to takeovers.
Additionally, we explore the extent to which firms switch from one
attribute to the other, and how this impacts their takeover likelihood.
Here, we find that firms that switch from underperforming to out-
performing categories face lower levels of takeover risk and vice versa.
Further, firms in underperforming categories that do not switch up face
higher takeover risks, but their counterparts in outperforming cate-
gories that do not switch down experience lower takeover risks. Finally,
we explore whether bidders play an important role in enforcing market
discipline. We do not find evidence that bidders are myopic. Indeed, we
find that firms we classify as hyperopia and efficient are more likely to
initiate takeover deals than their poor and myopia counterparts. These
results provide new insights on the disciplinary role of the takeover
market.
Our findings have implications for the notion of management or
firm performance. Our results suggest that performance, at least in the
context of M&As, is better understood as a multidimensional construct,
with poor, myopia, hyperopia and efficient representing four distinct at-
tributes of performance. In practice, such a multidimensional frame-
work for assessing performance could be useful in the design of optimal
managerial reward systems or contracts. It also provides a simple tool
for identifying firms that are most likely and least likely to manage
earnings. In research, several studies have explored how different
variables or strategic choices (e.g., corporate governance, capital or
ownership structure, corporate social responsibility, diversification,
executive compensation, etc.) influence firm performance across dif-
ferent contexts. A shift from a univariate to a multivariate framework
for measuring performance opens up new avenues to revisit and rethink
these research issues.
The study also, perhaps, has implications for the pervasive “earn-
ings game”, in which managers fixate on short-term earnings targets
even at the expense of long-term value creation. The results suggest that
if managers achieve such targets by sacrificing long-term value-gen-
erating projects, they may be doing so at their own peril—increasing
the probability of their firm becoming a takeover target.
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Table 13
Valuation, accounting performance and takeover likelihood.
The table reports results from panel fixed effects logit models (Eq. (10)) es-
timating a firm's takeover likelihood as a logit function of firm characteristics.
Pr[Targetit=1]= F(α+ β ∗ Performanceit−1+ γ ∗ Controlsit−1+ εit) (10)
Here, the dependent variable (Target) takes a value of one if a firm (i) is the
subject of a takeover bid for control in a period (t), and a value of zero
otherwise. We use MTB values (in place of AAR) and ROCE to classify firms in
four categories: poor, myopia, hyperopia and efficient. See Fig. 1 for details on the
classification procedure. We use the measures derived using MTB as our main
independent variable. The control variables in the model are fully discussed in
Appendix 1 and include measures of liquidity (LIQ), leverage (LEV), sales
growth (SGW), growth-resource mismatch dummy (GRD), industry disturbance
dummy (IDD), free cash flow (FCF), proportion of tangible assets (TANG), firm
size (SIZE), firm age (AGE), Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), block holders
dummy (BLOC), a rumour dummy (RUM), trading volume (TVOL) and market
sentiment (SENT). The coefficients of control variables are suppressed to save
space. The p-values for model coefficients are presented in parentheses. ***, **
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of sig-
nificance, respectively.









Controls YES YES YES YES
Obs. 14,185 14,185 14,185 14,185
Firms 1595 1595 1595 1595
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Appendix 1. Variables in the regression models
Prediction hypoth-
eses
Rationale for use in takeover likelihood modelling Proxy (sign) & DataStream codes Relevant references
Misvaluation Bidders seek to profit from takeovers by buying undervalued targets for
cash at a price below fundamental value, or by paying equity for targets
that, even if overvalued, are less overvalued than the bidder.
Tobin's Q
TBQ (−): Market value of assets (MVA) to replacement cost of
assets (RCA), where MVA is the sum of book value of debt
(BVD) and market value of equity (MVE).
BVD is total assets (WC02999) minus shareholder equity
(WC03995).
MVE is number of shares outstanding (NOSH) multiplied by
share price in pounds (UP/100).
RCA is proxied by the book value of total assets (WC02999).
Market to book value
In additional tests, we have used the market to book (MTB)
value as an alternative proxy.
It is defined as market value of equity (MVE) divided by book
value of equity (WC02999-WC03255).
Danbolt et al.
(2016);






Takeovers are pursued to generate synergies by correcting for mis-
matches between a firm's growth opportunities (measured by sales
growth) and its available resources (measured by the firm's leverage
versus liquidity positions).
As in Palepu (1986), four variables are used to proxy this hypothesis.
Liquidity
LIQ (± ): Cash and short-term investments (WC02001) to
total assets (WC02999).
Leverage
LEV (± ): Total debt (WC03255) to total assets (WC02999).
Sales growth
SGW (± ): Change in total revenues (WC01001) as a ratio of
previous year's total revenues (WC01001).
Growth-Resource dummy
GRD (+): Dummy that takes a value of one if a firm has high





A firm's takeover likelihood will increase with the announcement of a
merger bid in that industry, as other industry players seek to consolidate
in order to compete effectively.
Industry disturbance dummy
IDD (+): Dummy is one if any merger is completed within a
firm's two-digit SIC industry in the year prior to the bid, and a
value of zero otherwise.
Palepu (1986).
Free cash flow Management which hoards or misappropriates excess free cash flows are
likely to face a challenge for corporate control. Besides the opportunity
to correct management inefficiency, the bidding firm is attracted by the
excess free cash flow in the target firm, as this free cash flow can be used
to reduce the net cost of acquisition.
Free cash flow
FCF (+): Ratio of net cash flow from operating activities





Real property Tangible fixed assets proxy for debt capacity and provide financial slack
to enable a firm to raise debt capital in times of need. These assets can
reduce a bidder's implicit takeover cost as they can be divested to raise
finance needed to complete the transaction.
Tangible assets
TANG (+): Ratio of property, plant and equipment




Firm size Several size-related transaction costs are associated with acquiring a
target and, therefore, the number of viable bidders for a target decreases
as its size increases.
Size




Firm age Firm endowments are generally low when firms are born, but increase
over time as firms invest in research and development. Older firms are
more endowed and knowledgeable about themselves. Hence, the prob-
ability of firm survival (takeover) within an industry increases (de-
creases) as firms grow older.
Firm age










Competition in product markets (i.e., low industry concentration) is
especially costly for inefficiently managed firms as it leads to their
elimination, possibly through takeovers.
Herfindahl-Hirschman index
HHI (−): Sum of the squared market shares derived from total






Block holders The presence of large shareholders facilitates takeovers as they can
reduce the bidder's takeover costs by splitting the gains on their own
shares with the bidder.
Presence of block holders
BLOC (+): Dummy is one if a firm has a significant (i.e., at




Merger rumours Several takeovers are preceded by M&A rumours. Rumours
RUM (+): Dummy is one if a firm is a rumoured target in a









Market anticipation and merger rumours can lead to active trading in
firms with a high likelihood of receiving takeover bids. Active trading is
evident through price momentum (rapid increase in share prices over a
short space of time) and an increase in the volume of shares traded.
Price momentum
MOM (+): t-statistic of the trend line on daily share prices
(UP) for the 90 days leading up to June 30 each year.
Trading volume
TVOL (+): Total number of shares traded daily (VO) in the
90 days leading up to June 30 each year as a ratio of the shares
outstanding (NOSH).
Brar et al. (2009);
Danbolt et al.
(2016)
Market sentiment Market conditions shape the timing of acquisitions. Takeovers are more
likely to be initiated in periods of overall market growth.
Market sentiment
SENT (+): Dummy is one if FTSE All-Share index (RI) reports
a positive return in the year, and zero otherwise.
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